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This study deals with the relationship between merit
pay, organizational climate, and other variables in
elementary schools.

The research in this study involves

eight research questions that fall into two categories.

The

first category, deals with faculty behavior and and elements
of organizational climate attributable to faculty
interactions.

The second category, deals with elements of

organizational climate attributable to principal behavior.
The literature review focused on merit pay and the
issues, both pro and con, that continue to make incentive
pay systems a controversial topic in education.

Also

reviewed, is the literature dealing with the organizational
climate of schools, as well as the literature dealing with
climate related issues.
The methodology for this study involved the
collection of data using the Organizational Climate
Description Questionnaire - RE and a demographic response
form.

Sixty-six teachers from four Du Page County, Illinois

elementary schools responded to both research tools.

Two of

the schools were from merit pay elementary districts, the
other two schools were from non-merit pay school districts.

A t test was performed to test the differences between
groups and to aid in answering the research questions.
In the area of faculty relations, the research
indicated that the two merit pay schools had slightly more
open climates than did the two non-merit pay schools.
significant differences in collegiality were found to exist
between teachers with 0-5 years of experience and those with
20 plus years of experience.
more collegial.

The more senior teachers being

The non-merit pay schools were found to

have more engaged faculty members.

The merit pay schools

were found to have a significantly more intimate
organizational climate.
In the area of principal behavior, the non-merit pay
schools had principals who were more open than their merit
pay counterparts.

As a group, the merit pay schools had

stronger directive scores.

Stronger supportive qualities

were found to exist in the two non-merit pay schools.
Teachers with more than 20 years of experience perceived
more support from principals than did teachers with 0-5
years of experience.

Restrictive behavior scores were

strongest in the merit pay schools when schools were srouped
by type.

A significant difference in scores for

restrictiveness existed between union and non-union
teachers.
Included in this study are implications for use of
the information gleaned from the study, as well as
recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The decade of the 1980's has seen strident efforts
undertaken towards reforming the structure of
education.

At the heart of these reform efforts has

been the search for excellence.

Included in that

search for excellence has been the overwhelming feeling
that with an improvement in the quality of teaching
afforded America's students, a corresponding increase
in the quantity and quality of student learning will be
brought about.
Americans?

What fueled this belief held by so many

A spate of national reports dealing with

education reform were published beginning in 1983.
premier document entitled A Nation

The

At Risk 1 was

released to the American public in April, 1983.

The

report was the end result of the work of the National
Commission on Excellence in Education appointed in
August, 1981 by then Secretary of Education

1 National Commission on Excellence in Education,
A Nation At Risk (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1983).

2

Terrell Bell.

Among the Commission's recommendations

was, "Salaries for the teaching profession should be ·
professionally competitive, market sensitive, and
performance based.

112

Led by the power and prestige of the federal
government and the chief administrative officer of
government, President Ronald Reagan, the debate over
merit pay began.

While the President and other figures

in and out of government and/or education became
proponents of merit pay programs, the opponents of such
plans were not difficult to ferret out.

Both the

National Education Association, the nation's largest
teachers union, and the American Federation of Teachers
early in the decade came out squarely against merit
pay.
Historically, merit pay is in essence the first
form of teacher compensation.

The images of Ichabod

Crane or the school marm of the old west, are of
teachers who were paid for the quality of their
instruction, based upon the perception of the town
elders.

However, America in the twentieth century is a

2

Ibid, as reported in, The Excellence
Report-Using It to Improve Your Schools, (Washington,
D.C.: American Association of School Administrators),
p. 11.

3

vastly different place, as are its schools.

No longer

do the townspeople decide if, for whatever reasons,
faculty members retain their positions or receive a
salary increase.
In September of 1983, the Phi Delta Kappan 3
published its annual Gallup Poll Survey of the public's
attitudes towards education.

In that issue, the Poll

revealed that the general populace favored merit pay
for teachers by a margin of two-to-one (61% to 31%).
In a similar poll taken in 1970, 58% of those polled
felt that teachers should be paid on the basis of
merit.

Significantly, when those who were familiar

with the President's Commission report were asked about
their opinion of paying teachers on the basis of merit,
71% favored the idea as opposed to 25% who did not
favor merit pay.
Once again in 1984 the Phi Delta Kappan 4 sought
the public's view of merit pay.

For the total

3 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Nationwide Poll," Phi
Delta Kappan, (September, 1983), p. 45.
4 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Annual Poll," Phi Delta
Kappan (September, 1984), p. 34.

4

sample of those polled, 65% of respondents favored
merit pay, while 22% opposed, and 13% had no opinion.·
However, when confined to those individuals who were
aware of merit pay proposals, 76% favored paying
teachers on merit, while 19% of the respondents opposed
the idea, and 5% had no opinion.

It could be said,

that generally the public favored paying teachers on
the basis of merit.
A month after publishing its annual poll of the
public's attitude toward education in 1984, the Phi
Delta Kappan

5

published the results of a Gallup Poll of

the nation's teachers.

Merit pay questions of

differing varieties were asked in that survey.

Not

surprisingly, America's teachers were not enamoured
with the idea of merit pay.

Sixty-four percent of

teachers opposed merit pay, 32% endorsed the idea and
another 4% had no opinion.

Chief among the reasons for

opposing merit pay was the idea that it would be
difficult to give a fair evaluation (23%).

Also cited,

was the fact that merit pay would create morale
problems

(15%)~

administrators can't evaluate fairly

(12%), and teaching can't be objectively measured
(12%).

Of those who supported merit pay, 25% favored

5 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Annual Teacher's Poll,"
Phi Delta Kappan, (October, 1984), p.103.

5

the idea because they felt that through merit pay good
teachers would be rewarded.

Only one per cent of a11·

teachers queried felt that children would benefit as a
result of teachers being paid through a merit pay
program.
When asked whether or not teachers felt that
their colleagues were deserving of merit pay despite
their feelings towards such plans, 76% of all teachers
felt that, indeed teachers in their schools deserved
such a reward.

Sixteen per cent of those responding to

the survey felt that no teacher in their school
warranted merit pay, and eight per cent of the teacher
respondents had no opinion.

When asked what percentage

of teachers deserved merit pay, those teachers who
favor such plans responded that, on average, 33% of all
teachers deserved merit pay.

The range of responses

however, showed that 13% of teachers felt that under
10% of teachers warranted merit salaries, 23% of
teachers felt 10% to 19% of teachers deserved merit
pay~

17% of teachers were of the opinion that 20% to

29% of teachers warranted merit

pay~

30% to 59% of all teachers performed

another 23% felt
meritoriously~

and

17% of teacher respondents agreed tht 60% to 98% of all
teachers warranted merit salary increases.
Who should determine merit pay?

According to

the October, 1984 Gallup Poll, 63% of U.S. teachers

6

felt that a committee of teachers should make that
determination.

The next most frequent response was the

school principal (59%), followed by a committee of
outside educators (42%).

The poll showed that only 20%

of the teacher respondents felt that parents or
students should be involved in that decision.

The

Gallup Poll of 1984 showed a dramatic difference of
opinion on merit pay between teachers and the consumer
public.

By a four to one margin the public favored

teacher merit pay.

Sixty-eight per cent of the public

held the opinion that academic achievement or the
improvement of student performance, measured by
standardized tests, should be the single criteria used
to determine merit.

Only 39% of American teachers

agreed with that viewpoint.

Sixty-six per cent of

teachers felt that their colleagues should determine
merit, only 48% of the American public agreed with that
viewpoint.
In summation the September, 1984 Gallup Poll of
the American public and the October, 1984 Gallup Poll
of American teachers showed some widely disparate views
of merit pay.

Thirty-two per cent of American teachers

favored merit pay, while 76% of the public saw such
plans as favorable.

Sixty-four per cent of teachers

opposed merit pay, only 19% of the American public
agreed with them.

When it came to criteria for

7

determining merit, the single largest gap between
teacher opinions and those of the U.S. public was
apparent in the area of academic achievement or
improvement of students as measured by standardized
tests.

Thirty-nine per cent of teacher respondents

felt that student achievement was a valid criteria for
determining merit.

Sixty-eight per cent of the

American public agreed with them.

The second largest

gap came in the area of peer evaluation, wherein 66% of
teachers felt that to be a valid measurement of merit.
On the other hand, 48% of the American public agreed
with that view.
The seventeenth Annual Gallup Poll results were
published in the September, 1985 Phi Delta Kappan 6 •

In

that issue the Poll showed that six of ten Americans
continued to favor merit pay for teachers, about the
same numbers as the 1984 Poll.

Specifically, 60% of

Americans favored merit pay, 24% opposed the idea and
16% had no opinion.

For the most part, it is clear

that while most Americans favor merit pay for teachers,
those who do the teaching in the nation's

6 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Seventeenth Annual Poll,"
Phi Delta Kappan, (September, 1985), p.39.

8

schools hold the opposite view, thereby reflecting the
official positions of the two major teacher's unions in
the United States, the National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers.

Both

organizations have historically opposed the notion of
merit pay for the country's teachers, with the NEA
taking the most vociferous anti-merit pay stance.
In the context of education, organizational
climate may be viewed as a school's personality.

There

has not been a great deal of study in the area of
organizational climate of schools.

The first work was

that of Andrew W. Halpin and Don B. Croft

whose

research 7 in this area was published in 1962.

In more

recent times, the work of Wayne K. Hoy of Rutgers
University in the area of organizational climate has
led to the development of a more contemporary version
of Halpin and Croft's, Organizational Climate
Description Questionnaire.

Hoy's work 8 , published in

1986, is the basis of the development of his
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE

7 A.W. Halpin and D.B. Croft, The Organizational
Climate of Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of
Education, August, 1962).
8 Wayne K. Hoy and Sharon I.R. Clover,
"Elementary School Climate: A Revision of the OCDQ,"
Education Administration Quarterly, XXII, No.!,
(Winter, 1986), pp.93-110.

9

(Revised, Elementary). While not viewed in much the
same way as Halpin and Croft's work and that of Hoy,
others have dealt with the issues surrounding and
involving organizational climate.

Various works and

treatises, to be reviewed in Chaper Two of this
dissertation will deal in detail with these works.
What is important however, is the major focus of this
research study.

Primarily, this study hoped to

determine if any differences exist in the
organizational climates of merit pay schools as opposed
to non-merit pay schools.

A major component of

organizational climate is staff morale.

As reported

earlier, the October, 1984 Phi Delta Kappan 9 reported
that 12% of the nation's teachers were opposed to merit
pay because they felt such programs would create morale
problems in schools.

A part of this study dealt with

such issues as staff morale in both merit pay and
non-merit pay schools.
The purpose of this dissertation was to
determine if significant differences exist in the
school climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools.
The procedures utilized in this study attempted to seek

9 Phi Delta Kappa, "Our Teacher's Poll," Phi
Delta Kappan, (October, 1984), p. 103.

10
answers to a series of research questions.

Among these

research questions, which are based on the
sub-categories of the OCDQ-RE, were the following:
1.

Is the organizational climate in merit pay
schools less open than that of non-merit pay
schools?
2. Are principals in merit pay schools less
open than principals in non-merit pay
schools?
3. Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more
, collegial than teachers in merit pay
schools?
4. Are principals in merit pay schools more
directive that those in non-merit pay
schools?
5. Are principals in merit pay schools less
supportive than those in non-merit pay
schools?
6. Are principals in merit pay schools more
restrictive than non-merit pay principals?
7. Are teachers in merit pay schools more
disengaged than non-merit pay teachers?
8. Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit
more intimate behavior than teachers in
non-merit pay schools?
Clearly, school climate is a result of the
relationships that teachers experience with their
colleagues and their principals.

These day to day

relationships help to form the school's personality and
set the tone of the school.

Because merit pay may be

seen as a method of rewarding some more than others,
based upon the perceptions of the school principal, do
such plans have an impact in forming the school's
organizational climate?

Do merit pay programs have an

impact upon the relationships that teachers have with

11

one another and with their principal, who is charged
with the improvement of instruction?
In addition to a study of school climate in a
sample of merit pay and non-merit pay schools, this
study also reviewed literature dealing with merit pay
and organizational climate.

Through a review of

literature, a definition of merit pay and other terms
will be established for use in this study.

While

organizational climate has not been the sole focus of
major treatises in education, a number of relatively
recent works that deal with collegiality, teaching
conditions, teacher/principal relations and other
school climate-like issues will be reviewed in Chapter
Two of this dissertation.
Also covered in this dissertation will be the
methodology used in gathering data.

A discussion of

the instruments used as well as the processing and
statistical analysis of data will be discussed in
Chapter Three.

Presentation of the data gathered for

this dissertation will be made in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five of this dissertation will focus on
a summary of the collected data.

This chapter will

also include the findings and conclusions of the
researcher in addition to recommendations for further
study dealing with the issues of the organizational

12
climate of schools and/or performance-based salary
systems.

CHAPTER II
Review of Literature
The related literature is replete with articles,
surveys, a limited number of unpublished dissertations,
opinion papers and government documents that deal with
the topic of merit pay.

There is also evidence of

related literature, albeit somewhat limited when
compared to merit pay, that deals with organizational
climate.

However, this researcher could not locate

related literature that deals with the dual study of
the impact merit pay may or may not have on the
organizational climate of elementary schools.
Therefore, this chapter will deal with some of the
related literature of merit pay, as well as that of
organizational climate of schools, and, at the same,
time attempt to develop a perspective as to how the two
topics may affect one another as forces operating
within the elementary school setting.
Merit pay became a major issue in contemporary
American education with the publication and release of
the National Commission of Excellence in Education's
report, A Nation At Risk 10 in April, 1983.

The opening

10 Nat1ona
.
1 Comm1ss1on
.
.
.
on Exce 11 ence in
Education, A Nation at Risk (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1983).

14
paragraph of that now famous report warned that,
" ••• the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity
that threatens our very future as a Nation and a
peep 1 e.

ull

The report also went on to state

that," ••• we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of
our educational system for the benefit of all-- old and
young alike, affluent and poor, majority and
'
't y. 1112 AN a t'ion At R'is k th en procee d e d t o map out
m1nor1
a series of recommendations for five aspects of
American education:
Expectations
and Fiscal.
seven parts.

C.

A. Content

Time

D.

Recommendation

B.

Teaching

Standards and
E.

Leadership

D. Teaching, consisted of

Part two of that recommendation simply

stated,
Salaries for the teaching profession should be
increased and should be professionally competitive,
market-sensitive and performance-based. Salary,
promotion, tenure and retention decisions should be
tied to an effective evaluation system that
includes peer review so that superior teachers can
be rewarded, average ones enco~3aged, and poor ones
either improved or terminated.

11
Ibid., as reported in, The Excellence Report Using It to Improve Your Schools, (Washington, D.C.:
American Association of School Administrators), p. 3.
12

Ibid. p. 3.

13 Ibid. p. 11.

15
Certainly, the most controversial issue relating
to teachers in A Nation At Risk was over the renewed
call for merit pay.

That aspect of the report alone

consumed a great deal of national interest and fueled a
new national debate.

Teacher's unions, most notably

the National Education Association, the country's
largest, did not look favorably upon merit pay.
However, those in state and federal governments as well
as such organizations as the National School Boards
Association took positions supporting the notion of
merit pay.

Five months after the release of A Nation

at Risk, the National School Boards Association's, The
American School Board Journal, published the results of
their nationwide poll.

Entitled, "Our nationwide poll:

most teachers endorse the merit pay concept," 14 the
article reported that nearly two-thirds of America's
teachers (62.7%) favored merit pay.

The survey was

taken of a randomly selected sample of 7300 teachers
across the United States in May, 1983.

Of the 7300

teachers surveyed 1261 were tabulated.

To determine

teacher favorability towards merit pay, those surveyed
were asked to agree or disagree with the statement,

14Marilee c. Rist, "Our nationwide poll: Most
teachers endorse the merit pay concept," American
School Board Journal, Vol. CLXX, No. 9 (September,
1983), p.23.

16
"Teachers who are more effective in the classroom
should receive larger salary increases than teachers
who are less effective."

The survey revealed that

61.5% of National Education Association members favored
merit pay, as did 62.1% of American Federation of
Teachers members while 76.4% of non-union teachers also
supported merit pay.

The Journal article claimed to be

the only survey ever to ask teachers what they felt
about merit pay.

Proportional numbers of responses

were received of teachers nationally in such categories
as sex, tenure status, school level, marital status,
union membership and community setting.

The definition

used as a basis for merit pay was, "merit pay is a
monetary stipend or salary increase paid for superior
performance, as determined by a classroom performance
evaluation. 1115
The American School Board Journal also asked
teachers who they felt should determine merit.
Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents made the
principal their first choice.
principal were as follows:

The rankings after the

teacher peers 25.4%:

department heads 15%: a combination of administrators
and teachers 12.1%: curriculum specialist 5.5%: others
3%.

Teachers were also asked to check how merit salary

15

rbid. p.23.

17
increases should be determined.

Choices given were:

1) by classroom effectiveness alone, 2) by seniority/·
academic credits alone, 3) by a combination of factors
one and two with greater weight given to
seniority/academic credits, and 5) by a combination
weighting each factor equally.
Forty-one per cent of the teacher respondents to
the Journal survey felt that classroom effectiveness
coupled with seniority/academic credits equally
weighted should be used to determine merit pay salary
increases.

A total of 26.8% of respondents believed

that both factors should be considered, with greater
weight given to effectiveness.

The traditional union

stance, that the sole criteria should be seniority, was
supported by 17.6%.

An additional 11.5% favored both

performance and seniority with greater weight placed
upon seniority and credits.

Startlingly, only 3.1% of

the respondents felt that classroom performance should
be the sole criteria for determining merit.

Such a

plan, the Journal warned its readers, would pit the
teachers against school board members.
The National School Boards Association study had
other revealing facts about merit pay.

Younger

teachers were more apt to favor merit pay than older
teachers.

The study showed that 85.3% of those who

have taught less than three years favored merit pay,
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while 59.1% of those who have taught longer than
fifteen years gave a favorable rating to the idea.
Non-tenured teachers also tend to agree with the
concept of merit pay more than tenured teachers.
Although both agree with the idea of performance-based
pay, 70.2% of non-tenured teachers favor merit pay
while 61.2% of their tenured colleagues agreed with
them.

Male teachers (66.3%) favored merit pay more

than female teachers (59.9%).

The study also revealed

that married teachers (64.1%) approved of merit pay
while 56.6 of divorced teachers and 52.2% of widowed
teachers supported the merit pay concept.
The NSBA research also showed that elementary
school teachers (55.3%) favored merit pay the least.
Middle school teachers (64.7%) followed, with junior
high teachers (65.7%) and high school teachers (69.2%)
favoring performance based salary programs.
type had the slightest difference of opinion.

Community
The

study revealed that 59.4% of urban teachers supported
merit

pay~

63.7% of suburban teachers agreed with them

and 64% of rural teachers agreed with the idea of merit
pay.
Although a plurality of thirty-nine per cent of
teachers said that principals should be responsible for
evaluation, some differences of opinion based upon
school type and union membership was evidenced in the
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National School Board's Association survey.

Non-union

members (52%) chose the principal as the prime
evaluator more often than NEA members (39.2%) and AFT
members (39.1%).

Union members tend to favor their

peers as the prime evaluators.

The survey revealed

that 25.4% of the NEA members and 27.5% of the AFT
members preferred peer review as the method of
evaluation for determing merit pay.
Elementary school teachers (59.3%) favored the
principal as primary the evaluator of classroom
performance.

Their colleagues at other levels of

schooling agreed with them as follows: middle school
teachers (38.9%),

junior high school teachers (28.8%),

and high school teachers (21.4%).

If not the

principal, then who should determine the level of
classroom performance?

Twenty-two per cent of teachers

at the middle school level chose their peers, another
16.3% of their middle school colleagues chose
department heads.

Of the junior high school teachers

responding to the survey, 28.8% felt that their peers
should be the prime evaluators, while 21.2% of their
fellow teachers felt that their department heads should
be the prime evaluator.

Thirty-one percent of high

school teachers favored peer evaluation, while another
28.1% of their colleagues chose their department heads
as the primary evaluator of classroom performance.
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The National School Boards Association survey
clearly demonstrated that teachers were at least open
to the idea of making salary increases at least
partially contingent upon the level of classroom
performance.
In the Summer, 1984 issue of Planning and
Changing, 16 Gail Thierbach Schneider, reports on her
attitudinal study of 126 school board members, 435
administrators, and 381 teachers.

Schneider's study

was completed as a follow-up to the National School
Boards Association merit pay study.

The intent of

Schneider's work was to identify levels of agreement
between school board members, administrators and
teachers on merit pay, and whether or not significant
areas of disagreement existed between the groups.
Schneider's research found that considerable
disagreement existed among the three groups on all
aspects of merit pay.

School board members tended to

be in greater agreement than both administrators and
teachers that merit pay would improve the quality of
education, identify ineffective teachers and increase

16 Gail Thierbach Schneider,"Schools and Merit:
An Empirical Study of Attitudes of School Board
Members, Administrators and Teachers Toward Merit
Systems," Planning and Changing, Vol. XV (Summer, 1984)
p. 89.
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community support for education.

Teachers

overwhelmingly disagreed and administrators only
marginally agreed with those issuses.

Schneider points

out that in view of the fact that the implementation
and success of any merit pay plan would depend upon
administrator and teacher support, careful
consideration should be given to to the findings of her
research before any merit plan is initiated.

Also of

concern is, given the opinions revealed in this study,
that the time, effort, and additional money needed to
implement a merit pay system would raise questions of
the value of such a program.

Schneider's secondary

concern is whether or not an evaluation process can be
identified that will be perceived as valid and reliable
in making objective merit decisions.
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett 17 found several
concerns about the implementation of merit pay plans in
their survey of approximately 200 teachers.

Chief

among those were: 1.) Creation of morale problems.
2.) Prejudices, biases, and personality conflicts will
enter into merit decisions.

3.) Student class

assignments will become problematic, with parents

17 Charlie
. Q. Coffman an d Pr1sc1
.
'11 a
Manarino-Leggett, "What Do Teachers Think of Merit Pay?
Study Lists Important Variables," NASSP Bulletin, Vol.
LXVIII (November, 1984) p. 54.
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asking that their children be assigned to the most
meritorious teachers.
merit will receive it.

4.) Not all teachers who deserve
5.) Teacher patronage of

administrators who make merit decisions.
Reasons advanced in support of merit pay in the
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett study were: 1.) Improved
and better performance.

2.) Reward for excellence.

3.) Motivation for good teaching and elimination of bad
teachers.

4.) Increase in the quality of teaching.

5.) Reward for those who make extra efforts.
In addition to expressing past objections to
performance-based salary systems, such as a lack of
cooperation in districts that focus on merit, and
humiliation of those teachers who are non-recipients,
Coffman and Manarino-Leggett reported that almost all
of their survey respondents expressed concern about the
lack of ability of those assigned the task of
assessment, to make fair and adequate performance
appraisals for merit pay purposes.
An analysis of the Coffman, Manarino-Leggett
study revealed that those with a masters degree favored
merit pay more than those with a bachelors degree.
Those with more experience in teaching looked less
favorably upon merit pay.

Although age had no apparent

affect upon responses, males were against merit pay by
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a three to one ratio, while females vetoed the concept
by a two to one margin.
On June 17, 1983 Carl Perkins, Chairman of the
Education and Labor Committee of the United States
House of Representatives, appointed a task force on
merit pay.

The task force, both independent and

bi-partisan, consisted of twenty-one members, seventeen
from the private sector.

The charge to the group was

to study the issue of merit pay and to develop and
report on merit programs in education.
The Merit Pay Task Force heard witnesses from
three major commissions that had recently issued
educational reports dealing with reform.

Governors,

state legislators, deans of schools of education,
students, teachers, principals and school board members
also provided testimony.

The Task Force also reviewed

existing and proposed systems of performance-based
salary systems.

The group recognized that two forms of

programs existed that recognized exemplary performance.
Merit pay was defined by the Task force as a system
that, "attempts to base salary on performance. 1118

18 committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House
of Representatives, "Merit Pay Task Force Report," U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 5.
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The Task Force also made note of the fact that, "Under
merit pay there often is no sustained

pay increase,

although teachers may be eligible every year. 1119
The career ladder system was also recognized by
the Task Force as a system of rewarding teachers for
exemplary performance.

Career ladder systems, "create

tiers from entry level through master teacher with
varying pay and responsibilities at each level. 1120

The

Task Force then set out to describe such a plan by
outlining the responsibilities, requirements and
remuneration accorded teachers at various levels
described as: Apprentice Teacher, Professional Teacher,
Senior Teacher and Master Teacher.
In making its recommendation, the Merit Pay Task
Force clearly questioned the efficacy of merit pay when
it warned that, "Those who view merit pay as some easy,
inexpensive, painless method of solving the nation's
education problems are not realistic. 1121 Instead, merit
pay was seen as a part of a puzzle in an effort to
elevate the level of esteem and public perceptions of
the teaching profession.

19
20

Ibid. p.S.
Ibid. p.S.

21 Ibid. p.6.

The Task Force did not

25
confine itself solely to recommendations about merit
pay.

It recognized that the salary levels of teaching,

in addition to its public esteem, needed improvement.
However, it did

make five distinct features to be

included in what the group called experiments in
performance-based pay.

Some of these features included

involvement of teachers, administrators and the
community in the establishment of benefits and criteria
of merit plans.

The Task Force also warned of the

potential abuse of merit systems that reward teachers
for other than outstanding performance.

Incentives

should be established so that teacher self-improvement
would be continued.

Once established, the group called

for continued upgrade and improvement of merit systems.
Finally, the Task Force stressed that, in most systems,
a potential danger existed if a school district failed
to recognize teachers who failed to fall into the
superior category.

These teachers were referred to in

the Task Force rei;fort as the, "lifeblood of the school
system.

1122
In 1983 the American Association of School

Administrators published, Some Points to Consider When
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Ibid. p.7.
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.
Meri' t p ay. 23 In attempting
.
you Discuss
to define
what merit pay is, the

AASA document found it easier·

to define what merit pay is not.

The booklet stressed

that first and foremost merit pay is not a costcutting
measure.

The AASA also noted that salary increases in

merit pay systems should not be withheld from teachers
to penalize less than exemplary teaching.
The AASA publication also reviewed why merit pay
programs have failed.

Citing teacher opposition as a

major cause of the failure of merit pay, the booklet
stated that, "Teachers have also contended
pay lowers morale.•• 24

that merit

Other reasons for the failure of

merit pay cited by the AASA were: inadequate financing,
difficulty in administering merit pay plans,
insufficiently prepared evaluators and, inconsistency
among evaluators.

Unilateral evaluations and quota

systems that create artificial cutoffs eliminating less
experienced teachers from

23

receivi~g

merit increases

American Association of School Administrators,
Some Points to Consider When You Discuss Merit Pay
(Arlington, VA: American Association of School
Administrators, 1983).
24

Ibid. p.16.
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and the expense of such systems were also cited.
In recognizing that the reason merit pay is supported
is out of a perceived need to improve instruction, the
AASA publication points out that schools can no longer
attract the "best and the brightest" to the ranks of
teaching.

The Association also establishes in the

booklet seven steps to include in the design of merit
pay programs.

They include: 1.) Involve the right

people. 2.) Conduct the right research. 3.) Decide what
you want. 4.) Design a program that gives you what you
want. 5.) Document the program. 6.) Put your plan in
action. 7.)Find out if the program is working: refine
1' t •
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Finally, stressing that improved productivity is

the key element in assessing a merit pay program, AASA
defines productivity as:
Producing more knowledge (content) at agreed-on
levels of quality. Producing more skills.
Providing education for more students.
Improving
conditions that lead to more funds or more eff25tive
use of existing funds for effective education.
Keeping the productivity element foremost, AASA lists
possible elements of a teacher plan for increasing
productivity above standard performance.

25
26

Ibid. p.36.
Ibid. p.36.

Included in
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those elements are goals and objectives, action plan,
results expected, method of measurement, method of
verification, measurement and additional
.
27
compensa t ion.
In 1984, the Association for Supervision
and Curriculum Development published, Incentives for
Excellence In America's Schools. 28

A report of ASCD's

Task Force on merit pay and career ladders, the
publication was aimed at assisting the Association's
members in understanding the issues surrounding merit
pay and career ladders.

What the report clearly stated

in its very beginning was,
Another very important goal is to place the issue of
merit pay in the broader context of human resource
development because comprehensive changes that
promote effective management of schools and
professional growth of teachers will prove more
likely to positively influence teaching perform~~ce
than any merit pay programs that might succeed.
The ASCD Task Force made a concerted effort in its
Report to make a reasoned, careful analysis of the
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Ibid. p.38.

28 Association
.
.
f or s uperv1s1on
. .
. 1 um
an d c urr1cu
Development, Incentives for Excellence in America's
Schools, A report from the ASCD Task Force on Merit
Pay and Career Ladders (Alexandria, VA: Association
for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1984).
29 Ibid. p.l.
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sometimes emotionally charged issues of merit pay and
career ladders.

In laying forth the issues surrounding

merit pay, the ASCD publication first dealt with the
public perceptions about teaching.

The Task Force

identified six popularly held public perceptions:

1. Teaching is an unsophisticated and relatively
simple job.
2. Since teaching is simple, evaluation of teaching
must be simple.
3. The public schools are staffed by lazy (and/or
incompetent) teachers.
4. Money will motivate highly qualified people to
select teaching and persuade them to stay in
teaching once there.
5. The teaching profession cannot attract and hold
first-rate personnel because it lacks
performance-based financial incentives.
6. Merit pay ~a linked to raising standards in
education.
The ASCD Task Force delves into the public
perceptions of teaching and attempts to refute, while
at the same time establish, a basis for the public
views.

The Task Force Report explains that while many

in the general public may see teaching difficult at
times, those same individuals do not see teaching as
very complicated.

The Task Force does, however, see

the process as a complex act and the school room as the
rightful place of the professional.
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rbid. pp.3-6.

The group also
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points out that the reason evaluation is seen as simple
is that most of the public knows who the good teachers
are.

They acknowledge that a whole host of evaluation

problems exist with teaching and to simply
use pupil test scores on standardized tests is not a
wise or valid method for determining teacher
competence.
Simply stated, ASCD found no evidence to support
the public belief that public school teachers are
incompetent and/or lazy.

The Association also took

exception to the sometimes duplicitous view the public
takes about money and teaching.

The public wants

teachers who select the profession not for the money,
but the calling, as in the ministry.

Parents might be

suspicious of those who entered teaching for financial
reasons.

However, the same individuals who want

dedicated professionals working with their children
reason that teachers would do a more effective job and
would not leave the profession if paid a little more
money.

The Task Force saw no relationship between

money and improved performance.
Two reasons were cited by the ASCD group as to
why the profession cannot attract and hold the best and
the brightest to the profession.
to sex discrimination.

The first was an end

Professions previously closed

to women are now attracting women in large numbers.
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Teaching and nursing, two roles formerly thought to be
the only professional choice for women, consequently
lose a capable pool of bright, able individuals.
secondly, the group saw the fact that teacher's
salaries were grossly lower than those in private
industry as a reason why the more talented were not
attracted to teaching.

ASCD therefore proposes that

base salaries for teaching be raised and, at the same
time, questions whether or not the public would be
willing to pay bonuses of $20,000 or more to keep good
teachers from fleeing to the private sector in efforts
to match the earning potential they would find in
private industry.
Finally, the ASCD group points out that the link
between merit pay and higher standards is an absurdity.
In discussing that link, they point out that merit may
be seen by some to be a solution in itself.

To now

recognize those who all along have been doing the same
quality work as suddenly meritorious indicates that the
performance has improved.
In planning for merit pay systems, the ASCD
Report suggests that three groups of questions about
merit pay need to be addressed.

These include

questions about goals and planning, design and
implementation, and context and choices.

The first

group of questions deals with solutions to problems
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that merit pay may resolve, how different
constituencies feel about merit pay and short and long
term results.

The second group of questions deals with'

differentiated pay allocation, the evaluation process,
evaluators, access to higher paying positions, demotion
and continued support from proponents of merit pay.
Critical to questions of context and choices is the
question of an adequate assessment of costs and the
question of continued financial support over time.
The Task Force determined that certain
management practices discouraged excellence in schools.
Chief among them was the fact that, "Schools lack the
kind of peer support systems that encourage excellence
in other professions and that are independent of
compensation systems. 1131
In September, 1987 the National School Boards
Association and the Illinois Association of School
Boards, jointly published Rewarding Excellence:
Teacher Compensation and Incentive Plans.32
publication is a part of what might be termed

The
the

result of the second wave of reform in education that
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School Boar d s Assoc1at1on,
Rewar d"ing
Excellence: Teacher Compensation and Incentive Plans
(Washington, D.C.: 1987).
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began in 1985.

It discussed some of the advantages and

disadvantages to "monetary incentive programs."

The

NSBA found the following advantages of incentive pay
programs:
1.) They frequently emphasized evaluation.

2.) They

of fer school districts a way of rewading outstanding
teachers.

3.) They offer teachers career advancement

without leaving the classroom.

4.) They are a way to

motivate the performance of all teachers.

5.) They

offer one way of building public support for education.
The NSBA points out that research has identified
two major disadvantages to monetary incentive programs:
1.) They may not work under current teacher salary
conditions.

2.) They may create dissatisfaction.

The

Association feels that in order to be successful, every
merit pay program must be based upon a valid, reliable,
objective performance appraisal method that is carried
out by trained, qualified evaluators.
The 1987 NSBA publication concludes with a quote
from the House of Representatives report on merit pay
stating that, "The question the Nation must face is not
simply how to implement performance-based pay for

*+r~-~~~
..,i'"
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educators, but how we can lift the standards of
instruction in the Nation. 1133
As part of its 1983-84 hot topics series, the
Phi Delta Kappa Center on Evaluation, Development and
Research published , Merit Pay and Evaluation. 34

In a

reprinted article from Personnel Administrator, 35 James
T. Brinks, an expert in compensation, benefit plans and
design and performance measurement systems, cites
several arguments against merit increases.

Amongst

Brinks' list are: 1.) A general lack of objective work
performance systems, especially for salaried employees.
2.) Merit pay systems are difficult and costly to
operate.

3.) Most people are not motivated by money,

but rather by things such as advancement opportunity,
nature of the work itself, etc.

4.) Most supervisors

cannot make objective, valid distinctions in
performance.

5.) A merit system emphasizes that the

supervisor is "God."

6.) The vast majority of people

see themselves as well above-average.

Therefore,

33 committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House
of Representatives, "Merit Pay Task Force Report,"
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1983), p.6.
34Phi Delta Kappa.Merit Pay and Evaluation,
(Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, Center on
Evaluation, Development and Research, 1984).
35 Ibid. p.21.

35

average merit increases destroy self-esteem and thus
de-motivate

the employee.

7.) Differing merit

increases for the same work seem to go against the
government's push for "equal pay for equal work."

8.)

When inflation is six per cent or more, so much of the
annual increase is due to range change that the merit
portion is minimal.

9.) Merit pay increase budgets

assume a bell-shaped performance population.

In many

organizations eighty per cent of the employees are in
fact above-average performers.

10.) Most supervisors

play it safe and give everyone close to average
increases.

Thus the best employees leave, the worst

remain and are overcompensated.

11.) Most performance

ratings are based upon personality characteristics,
rather than objective results achieved.
Using Frederick Herzberg's motivation-hygiene
theory as a basis, Larry Frase, Robert Hetzel and
Robert Grant 36 discuss

an instructional excellence and

reward system implemented in their school district.
Citing Herzberg's theory that satisfaction (motivation)
and dissatisfaction (hygiene) are two separate factors

36 Larry E. Frase, Robert W. Hetzel and Robert T.
Grant, "Promoting Instructional Excellence Through a
Teacher Reward System: Herzberg's Theory Applied,"
Planning and Changing, Vol. XIII, No.2, (1982) p.67.
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that impact job performance, Frase, et al., outline a
program that they found successful.

Recognizing that·

opposition to merit pay included such reasons as:
1.) Merit rating cannot fairly evaluate the true
effectiveness of teachers.
conformity.

2.) Merit rating rewards

3.) Merit rating places a premium on

teachers who conduct their classsrooms with a minimum
of problems for administration.

4.) Merit rating

fosters a competitive rather than cooperative spirit.
5.) Merit rating threatens the security of teachers.
6.) Merit rating disregards the type of environment in
which a teacher teaches.

7.) Merit rating cannot

improve the quality of teaching.

A plan based upon

Herzberg's theory was designed to provide recompense to
teachers for excellent performance in the classroom.
The plan was developed with the purpose of
motivating individuals to continue excellent practices
in the classroom in working with students.

The most

significant aspect of the recompense plan, was the
capability of competent administrators at identifying
excellence in the classroom.

Principals recommended

teachers to the superintendent for recognition.

Funds

were distributed proportionately amongst the district's
schools.

Rewards included, attendance at out-of-state

professional conferences, cash, and instructional
materials.

Value of the rewards ranged from eighty to
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several hundred dollars.

Following implementation of

the program teachers were interviewed and completed a·
questionnaire.

Frase, et al, found that the rewards

most highly valued by teachers was attendance at
conferences, the reward least valued was money.
Teachers felt that recognition in the form of money was
unprofessional.

While the recognition program appears

to be successful, dissension within the teaching ranks
continues to be a problem with some teachers expressing
the desire to maintain secrecy over their recognition,
while others wish to have their notoriety published in
local newspapers.

The author's concluded, however,

that the program is successful in that both motivation
and hygiene needs, as cited by Herzberg's theory, are
met and have a positive effect upon instructional
performance in the classroom.
Writing in the April, 1983 Personnel Journal,
Silverman 37 cites ten reasons why the performance pay
system failed in the federal government.

As part of

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the performance
pay system became fully implemented in 1981.

However,

Silverman maintains that the system, whose objective

37 Buddy Robert s. Silverman, "Why the Merit Pay
System Failed in the Federal Government," Personnel
Journal, LXII, No. 4, (April, 1983) p.294.
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was to make reward and recognition more commensurate
with productivity, became a "shambles" and actually
disrupted the bureaucracy with complex procedures and
an overwhelming amount of paper work.

Silverman

contends that the performance pay system had a
devastating effect on cooperation and stimulated
competition within units of government.

Additionally,

Silverman says that merit pay failed because of
unintended statutory provisions, open-ended
regulations, novice technical assistance, drifting
implementation policies, flagrant administrative
errors, ludicrously complicated systems, inconsistent
employee treatment, motivational factors, managerial
pay compression, and simultaneous budget restrictions.
Finally, Silverman contends that the merit pay
system in the federal government did the same thing the
old system of compensation did, except that the
additional cost to tax payers was a billion more
dollars.

In essence, according to Silverman, politics

destroyed merit pay.
In a 1983 study Pruitt

38

found strong support

for merit pay programs among school systems that were
currently using performance-based salary programs.

The

38 sid c. Pruitt Jr., "Merit Pay for Classroom
Teachers" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, North Texas
State University, 1983).
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groups also strongly held the belief that
plans could be successful.

merit pay

The study also concluded

that merit pay should improve the quality of
instruction and would retain good teachers in the
nation's classrooms.
The Pruitt study surveyed the superintendent and
teacher union presidents in 139 merit pay school
districts and found that the basis of merit pay
decisions should be the quality of classroom
instruction.

Professional growth, extra sevice and

creative activities should be secondary activities and
not become part of the consideration in making merit
pay decisions.

The study also revealed that

evaluations should be made by principals, assistant
principals and department chairmen.

Teacher

self-evaluation was also seen as an important element
in the evaluation process.

Respondents favored

professional educators as being the primary
participants in the development of incentive pay plans.
Finally, Pruitt's study concluded that merit pay plans
should serve to motivate teachers to improve their
classroom instructional practices.
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In a 1983 study 39 Rike surveyed Illinois
principals and teachers in an effort to determine the ·
perceptions each group held about the methods and
criteria that should be utilized to evaluate teacher
performance in order to differentiate teaching status
or for merit pay

purposes.

The study also sought to

determine what criteria teachers deemed appropriate for
principals to evaluate their performance.

The research

also attempted to assess what criteria principals felt
they could utilize in measuring teacher performance for
differentiated staffing positions or performance pay.
Finally, the study sought to determine if there were
major differences between the perceptions held by
teachers and principals concerning the criteria,
methods, and the principals' ability to assess teacher
performance.
Rike's research study of 120 elementary school
teachers and 64 elementary school principals clearly
revealed that both groups favored classroom observation
as the primary method for evaluating teachers
(teachers,

67%~

principals, 70%).

The second choice

for teachers was interviews (30%), followed by goal

39 cheryl Jo Rike, "Iliinois Elementary Teachers'
and Principals' Perceptions of the Evaluative Methods
and Criteria Which Should Be Used to Designate Merit
Pay," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Southern
Illinois University, 1984).
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setting (17%).

The principals' second choice was goal

setting (30%), followed by student achievement (23%). ·
The data from the Rike study was instrumental in
developing the following conclusions: 1.) Both teachers
and principals prefer neither a master teacher or merit
pay plan, but a combination of both.

2.) The most

appropriate evaluator according to both groups is the
principal.

Teachers however, would accept a team of

evaluators that would include other teachers.

3.)

Classroom observation is the preferred method of
evaluation for both groups, with goal setting an
appropriate second.

4.) Of the 115 criteria listed by

the researcher, principals viewed all criteria as
acceptable measures of evaluation; teachers accepted
all but two,

( "is viewed as an attractive personality

by students and colleagues,'' and "willingly and
effectively sponsors extra-curricular activities").
5.) Teachers had a lower level of confidence in the
principals' ability to rate all criteria listed in the
study.

Major differences of opinion existed between

teachers and principals over such items as use of
instructional time, selection of methodology,
assessment procedures, assignment techniques and pupil
control.

6.) Both principals and teachers were

concerned over the lack of formal training principals
receive in evaluating teacher performance.

7.) Both
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teachers, principals and educational research
illustrated a concern over the amount of time deemed
appropriate to teacher performance appraisal and the
amount of time actually devoted to the enterprise.
This point, according to the researcher, would seem to
indicate that a principals'

job description should

state teacher evaluation as a priority.

8.) Teachers,

principals and research revealed a concern over
principal objectivity in evaluating teachers.
9.) Principals indicated that a personal lack of
teaching experience at the elementary school level was
a hindrance in effectively evaluating teachers.
Planck's 1985 study40 of sixteen rural Indiana
teachers' perceptions of merit pay revealed that
teachers had a fear of merit pay.

The study was based

upon focused, in-depth interviews with the sixteen
elementary and secondary school teachers.

Teachers

interviewed revealed that as a group teachers fear the
merit pay concept.

Each teacher doubted that merit pay

would help the district meet its goals.

The major

concern teachers held with regard to merit pay was
those who would be charged with evaluating.

Teachers

40 Jacquie Tinsley Planck, "Does Fear of Merit
Pay Exist? An Exploratory Study,'' (unpublished Ed.D.
dissertation, George Peabody College for Teachers of
Vanderbilt University, 1985).
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interviewed, generally believed that no evaluation tool
existed that would truly evaluate a superior teacher.
A majority of teachers felt that a committee of
evaluators would produce the "fairest " results.
Teachers did not favor the principal as the sole
evaluator.

Primary concerns over merit pay were that

it would create an atmosphere of rivalry thoughout the
school building.

Teachers express concern that the

present atmosphere of sharing of ideas and materials
and air of cooperation might fade if merit pay existed
in the school.
In a 1985 study41 of District of Columbia
teachers, Gafney found that a majority of the teachers
surveyed: 1.) did not favor an incentive salary system,
nor did they feel that such a system would aid teachers
financially,

2.) favored teacher involvement in the

development of a merit pay plan, but felt that such a
plan would not enhance teaching professionally, 3.)
believed that evaluations are too subjective and that
an incentive salary system would not be administered
fairly, 4.) believed that the best and brightest
individuals are not attracted to teaching, however,

41 Louvenia
. Magee Ga f ney, " I ncen t 'ive Pay Systems
As Viewed by Teachers in Selected Schools Within the
District of Columbia Public School System,"
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, George Washington
University, 1985).
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they agreed that teachers in certain academic areas
should not receive higher salaries in an attempt at
eliminating shortages in those areas, 5.) believed that
an incentive salary would not be useful in keeping
better teachers in the profession or would be useful in
terminating poor teachers, 6.) did not believe that an
incentive salary system would aid students, society, or
achieve excellence in education.
Gafney 42 did find two significant differences
in response to two questions in her survey.

Teachers

with less than ten years experience beleived that an
incentive salary system would attract brighter minds to
the profession, while those with more than ten years
experience disagreed.

Gafney also found that those

teachers who held a master's degree or higher held the
belief that their administrator/supervisor would not
fairly administer an incentive salary system.

Those

teachers surveyed who have earned less than the
master's degree believed that their present
administrator/supervisor would fairly administer an
incentive salary system.
Conclusions from Gafney's research indicate that
the less experienced teacher will view an incentive
salary system more favorably, while a more highly

42
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educated teacher will view incentive salary systems
less favorably.

LITERATURE RELATING TO ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE
The pioneering study of the organizational
climate of schools was completed by Andrew W. Halpin
and Don B. Croft in 1962. 43

Their approach to

organizational climate, was to map teacher-teacher and
teacher-principal relationships through the use of a
descriptive questionnaire that would aid in the
identification of those relationships.

Halpin and

Croft's observations were that schools differed in
their feel.

The idea of morale did not provide an

index of a school's feel.

In schools where improvement

was needed, assignment of the "right" principal for the
job often resulted in the imobilization of the
principal by the faculty.

Through the work of Halpin

and Croft the Organizational Climate Description
Questionnaire was developed.

Originally consisting of

sixty-four items, teachers were asked to respond to the

43 A.W. Halpin and D.B. Croft,The Organizational
Climate of Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of
Education, Research Project, August, 1962).
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question: To what extent is this true of your school?
Responses were scaled along a four point continuum:
1- rarely occurs, 2- sometimes occurs, 3- often occurs,
and 4- very frequently occurs.

Halpin and Croft's

instrument was used to identify eight characteristics
of a school's faculty, what Halpin and Croft called the
OCDQ subscales.

Four of the subscales referred to

teacher to teacher relations and are defined as:
Hindrance, teacher feelings that the principal burdens
them with routine duties and other responsibilities
that are seen as "busywork".

Intimacy, teacher

enjoyment of warm, friendly personal relationships with
one another.

Disengagement, the likelihood that

teachers merely, "go through the motions", lacking
commitment to the job.

Esprit, growth of morale due to

a sense of task accomplishment and social satisfaction.
The other four subscales of the OCDQ referred to
teacher-principal relationships and are defined as:
Productivity emphasis, a highly directive principal who
supervises closely and is insensitive to faculty
feedback.

Aloofness, a go-by-the-book principal,

characterized by formal, impersonal behavior.
Consideration, warm and friendly principal behavior
that features a principal who is helpful and does extra
things for the faculty.

Thrust, a leadership style
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that features a principal who sets an example for the
faculty.
Using scores from the subscales of the OCDQ, it
is then possible to identify a school's climate along a
continuum from open to closed.

Halpin and Croft's

research identified six types of school climate: open,
autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and closed.
Schools with an open climate would feature a high level
of esprit, high thrust, high consideration, high
intimacy, low production emphasis, low aloofness, low
disengagement and low hindrance.
together and are committed.
and emerges as needed.

Teachers work well

Leadership is appropriate

In the closed climate school,

esprit and thrust are low and disengagement high, as
are production emphasis and aloofness.
teacher apathy and frustration results.

Frequently
In determining

a school's openness index Halpin and Croft used the
following:
OPENNESS INDEX

=

Thrust score + Esprit score -

Disengagement score
The higher the index score, the more open the school's
climate.
Hoy and Miske1 44 report several criticisms of

44wayne K. Hoy and Cecil G. Miskel, Educational
Administration: Theory Reasearch and Practice (New
York: Random House, 1987).
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the OCDQ.

Chief among the criticisms was the

weaknesses in what might be termed the middle types of
school climates. 45

Halpin and Croft themselves, Hoy

and Miskel report, were more confident about the two
types of climates on the opposite ends of the spectrum
than those in the middle. 46

Hoy and Clover, 47 in

making their case for a new or revised OCDQ, report
that attempts to replicate the six types of school
climates identified by Halpin and Croft (open,
autonomous, controlled, familiar, paternal, and
closed), often failed. 48
Another problem that frequently arises with the
OCDQ is the unit of analysis.

Halpin and Croft's

original research focused on individuals.

Analysis of

their data was based upon 1151 individuals, not the
seventy-one schools in which those teachers were
employed.

Hoy and Clover 49 feel that a conceptual

45 rbid. p.228.
46
rbid. p.228.
47 Wayne K. Hoy and Sharon I.R. Clover,
"Elementary School Climate: A Revision of the OCDQ,"
Educational Administration Quarter! , Vol.XX!!, No. 1,
Winter, 1986 p.93.
48
49
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behavior, the remaining three dimensions describe
teacher behavior.
Hoy and Clover's three principal dimensions may
be summarized as:

Supportive, the principal listens

and is supportive of teachers.

Praise is frequent and

genuine, criticism constructive.

Principal displays

both a personal and professional interest in teachers.
Directive, the principal maintains close, constant
control and supervision over teachers and school
activities.

Restrictive, principal behavior hinders

rather than facilitates teacher work.

The principal

imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other
mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching
duties.
The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the
OCDQ-RE may be described as:

Collegial, supportive,

open and professional interactions exist among
teachers.

Faculty members enjoy working with one

another: enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of
professional competence of colleagues exists.
Disengaged, a lack of meaning and focus to professional
activities exists.

Faculty is non-productive in group

or team-building activities.
amongst teaching staff.

No common goals exist

Faculty behavior is often

negative and they are critical of their colleagues and
the organization.

Intimate, a cohesive strong network
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Directive, the principal maintains close, constant
control and supervision over teachers and school
activities.

Restrictive, principal behavior hinders

rather than facilitates teacher work.

The principal

imposes burdensome paperwork, routine duties, and other
mundane responsibilities that interfere with teaching
duties.
The three dimensions of teacher behavior of the
OCDQ-RE may be described as:

Collegial, supportive,

open and professional interactions exist among
teachers.
another~

Faculty members enjoy working with one
enthusiasm, acceptance and mutual respect of

professional competence of colleagues exists.
Disengaged, a lack of meaning and focus to professional
activities exists.

Faculty is non-productive in group

or team-building activities.
amongst teaching staff.

No common goals exist

Faculty behavior is often

negative and they are critical of their colleagues and
the organization.

Intimate, a cohesive strong network

of social support exists among faculty.

Teachers know

each other well, become personal friends, and socialize
frequently.
The result of Hoy and Clover's work is a
forty-two item instrument that consists of six subtests
that describe the behavior of elementary school
principals and teachers.

One element of the original
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OCDQ devised by Halpin and Croft is eliminated
(aloofness).

The esprit subtest of Halpin and Croft's

original is replaced by collegial teacher behavior.
The hindrance dimension of the original OCDQ is
eliminated, but is included in restrictive principal
behavior.
The new OCDQ features two factors.

One factor

measures the openness of teacher-principal relations,
the other is a measure of openness of teacher
interactions.

In the OCDQ-RE, it is possible to have

open teacher interactions and closed teacher-principal
interactions and vice versa.

Therefore, four types of

school organizational climate are possible:
factors may be closed.

1.) Both

2.) Both factors may be open.

3.) The principal may be open, but the faculty closed
with one another (disengaged).

4.) The principal may

be closed, but the faculty interactions may be open
(engaged).
The six subtests of Hoy and Clover's OCDQ-RE
have high reliability coefficients.

More importantly,

the unit of analysis of the OCDQ-RE is the school, not
the individuals.

Aspects of school climate are

organizational properties, not individual properties.
Each set of behaviors is defined by the construct of
openness and provide for a four-celled typology of
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school organizational climate:

open, closed, engaged

and disengaged.
In his 1983 work, A Place Called Schoo1, 51 John
Goodlad devotes considerable discussion to elements of
organizational climate in which teachers work.

In his

chapter entitled, "Teachers and the Circumstances of
Teaching,"
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Goodlad relates bits of

information that are important in understanding the
workings of what goes on in schools.

At the same time

he provides insights into the organizational climates
of the schools that served as the background of his
book.
John Goodlad recognizes that several factors
make up what he calls, "the quality of school life." 53
Among those factors are teacher behavior, the principal
and collaboration.

Clearly, as we have seen through

the work of Halpin and Croft, and Hoy and Clover
teacher behavior and the principal are important, if
not mandatory, factors that contribute to the
organizational climate of a school.

In a very real

sense so does the element of collaboration.

For

51 John I. Goodlad, A Place Called School (New
York: McGraw Hill, 1984).
52
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through collaboration with colleagues and principals,
as well as students and parents, collegial working
relationships can be established that aid in the
development of an open organizational climate.
In his book, Goodlad relates that most school
environments fall short in enabling teachers to
establish personal relationships with one another.

He

characterizes teaching as a lonely profession and
expresses concern for, "what effects this might have on
teacher behaviors, self-renewal, and relations with
students. 1154

Of great importance is the fact that

Goodlad reports that most teachers,

(80% at the

elementary level) expressed a high degree of career
fulfillment.

What prompts people to leave teaching,

according to Goodlad, are not interpersonal conflicts
between teachers and administrators, or for that matter
problems with students.

Teachers are bothered most by

personal frustrations and disssatisfaction in the
teaching situation.
Goodlad's concern is that the profession is able
to secure and maintain an able corps of professionals.
He calls for improvement in salary conditions and, more
importantly, the need to enhance the profession by
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improving its working conditions.

He points out that

improved conditions would increase both satisfaction
and productivity.SS

Among these improved conditions he

calls for supportive and sensitive principal
leadership, greater enthusiasm, career fulfillment,
teacher assistance programs and professionalism.
Goodlad's data on school climate was derived
from a list of 120 questions posed to teachers.

These

questions dealt with teacher autonomy, friendships with
other teachers, personal satisfaction, resources,
students, parents, personal safety, facilities and so
on.

What emerged from Goodlad's study was support for

the hypothesis that schools that possess teacher·s who
are satisfied with their careers and teaching
circumstances are perceived to provide students with a
good education.

This Goodlad contends leads to the

proposition that the, "quality of education provided by
a school, depends on the interaction between
teachers--more or less competent, more or less
satisfied, and the circumstances of schooling."S

6

Other aspects that affect organizational climate
that come from Goodlad's study include a relationship

SSibi'd. p. 176 •
S 6 Ib1' d. p. 178 •
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between teacher satisfaction and strong leadership on
the part of the principal.

Also, the data showed that

staff cohesiveness and the way in which problems were
solved as well as aspects of the decision making
process were elements that are highly related to
teacher satisfaction.

At more satisfying schools, the

data indicated that fewer teachers saw the
administration or staff relations as problems.

That

was not the case at what Goodlad termed the "less
satisfying schools."
In 1986, the United States Department of
Education published, What Works: Research About
Teaching and Learning. 57

The sixty-five page

booklet consisted of forty-one research findings in
education.

Included in the publication were allusions

to research findings that dealt with organizational
climate.

With regard to principals What Works made it

clear that effective principals are supportive of
effective instruction.

The publication also clearly

stated that the students are the benefactors of
professional collegiality among faculty members.

It

was pointed out that it is important for teachers to

57 united States Department of Education, What
Works: Research About Teachin and Learnin
Washington, D.C.: United States Department of
Education, 1986), pp. 32-34.
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share ideas, cooperate in activities, and assist one
another in intellectual growth.

Finally, What Works

made note of the fact that teachers welcome
professional suggestions about improving the quality of
their work, but rarely did they receive them.
Expanding on their work in the area of
cooperative learning, David and Robert Johnson
discussed their research on collegial learning groups
in the November, 1987 Educational Leadership. 58

They

stress that cooperation with other teachers is
important because much of what teachers need to know is
procedural in nature.

They contend that collegial

support groups of fer a formalized structure to assist
teachers in improving their on-the-job performance.
Such a program, they argue, is needed because in citing
Blake and Mouton's work, "teachers have not been
skilled in working with their peers." 59

Teachers and

administrators have for too long worked independently
as opposed to interdependently.

About merit pay, the

Johnson's claim that such programs have a harmful
effect upon teaching environments because they are

58 oavid W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson,
"Research Shows the Benefits of Adult Cooperation,"
Educational Leadership, Vol. VL. No. 3, (November,
1987) p.27.
59 rbid. p.27.
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built upon competition.

Teachers maximize personal

gain at the expense of their colleagues.

Instead, the

Johnson's support a merit pay system that bases awards
upon how well all members of the group performed.

In

such a system, teachers accept the responsibility to
improve not only their own productivity, but that of
the entire group as well.

The Johnson's contend that a

cooperative structure to school faculties develops
social support, professional self-esteem, positive
interpersonal relationships and achievement.

An

analysis of their study bears out this claim.60
In the March, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan, Gene
Maeroff writes that, "As long as teachers are not
adequately valued by themselves and by others, they are
not apt to perform with the necessary assurance and
authority to do the job as well as they can." 61
Maeroff points out that teaching, more than any other
profession, is practiced in isolation. Collegiality for
most teachers is nonexistent.

This lack of

collegiality, coupled with low salaries causes teachers
to lack respect for themselves as well as their fellow
faculty members.

GOibid. p.29.
61 Gene I. Maeroff, "A Blueprint for Empowering
Teachers," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LXVIV, No. 7. (March,
1988) p.473.
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Maerof f proposes a system of empowering teachers
to play a more active role in decision making.

He does

not propose the elimination of the principal's role,
but instead he supports a collaborative relationship
between teachers and principals.

Such a system not

only raises the esteem level of teachers but creates a
more enthusiastic professional environment.

Teachers

support one another and collegiality develops between
administrators and teachers who work together as
partners and share the power to improve the school
environment.
Writing in the May, 1988 Phi Delta Kappan,
Lieberman 62 points out that researchers have found
that collegiality must exist in schools before a more
professional cultural environment can be developed.
She states that, " ••• when principals encourage and
facilitate collegial work, the resultant interactions
among teachers build norms of collaboration. 1163
Lieberman also reports that in collaborative schools
teachers perceive their principals as supportive.
Teachers view problems as opportunities for collective

62 Ann Lieberman, "Teachers and Principals: Turf,
Tension and New Tasks," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LXIX,
No. 9, (May, 1988) p.648.
63 Ibid. p.650.
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learning.

In isolated schools, however, teachers tend

to be alienated from their principals and view their
requests as threats to the principal 1 s self-esteem.
In the February, 1988 Educational Leadership,
Lieberman writes, "In schools characterized by
collaborative relationships teachers seek out each
other for help: and principals support the idea that
any problem of any teacher can be worked out
collectively."
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By developing schools that are

collaborative in nature it is possible, according to
Lieberman, to restructure the profession.

The

possibilities of a restructured profession include:
1.) building collegiality, 2.) providing greater
recognition and status for teachers, 3.) enlarging the
reward structure, 4.) building a school structure that
permits autonomy, flexibility and responsibility,
S.) reshaping teaching as an occupation that encourages
young people to become teachers and at the same time
encourages experienced teachers to share their work,
6.) building a professional culture in schools that

64Ann Lieberman, "Expanding the Leadership Team,"
Educational Leadeership, Vol. XLV, No.S (February,
1988) p.4.
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broadens the way they function and become more
. .
t o th eir
. communi. t.ies. 65
sensitive
To summarize, the related literature regarding
merit pay continually drives home the point that
performance pay systems are an attempt to achieve and
recognize excellence, and at the same time garner
public support for education.

The proponents of

incentive systems support these programs in an effort
to improve the public's perceptions of the teaching
profession.

Merit pay programs are viewed as methods

of recognizing excellence in teaching and as a way of
luring the best and the brightest into a profession
that is no longer attractive.

It is the belief of

many, that through the development and implementation
of merit pay, public confidence in education will once
again be restored and the productivity of the
institution assured.
Detractors of merit pay are wont to point out
that such programs have a disastrous effect upon staff
morale.

Additionally, they point out that

performance-based salary programs are costly, not only
in dollars but in the additional time needed to
appropriately evaluate teaching.
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incentive pay systems question whether the public would
support financially the increased costs such programs
would bear.

Those who do not look favorably on merit

pay, question the existence of objective evaluation
systems and the training programs needed to adequately
train those who will make merit award decisions.
The related literature dealing with
organizational climate clearly makes the point that the
organizational climate of schools can be measured.

It

is possible to determine the typology of a school's
climate.
school.

The apppropriate unit of analysis is the
Such measures are based upon the perceptions

faculty members have about teacher interactions and
teacher-principal relations.
The related literature points out that more open
schools tend to be perceived as more successful
schools.

The literature indicates that certain

qualities and characteristics of human dynamics may
improve a school's organizational climate.

Working

conditions also play an important role in improving the
level of job satisfaction that teachers hold.
To some extent, unlike the proponents of merit
pay, those with an interest in organizational theory
believe that the drive toward excellence and improved
productivity can be reached through a better
environment in the workplace.

A better climate may be
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achieved through collaboration.

It has been said that

teaching is a profession carried out in isolation.
Schools need to improve upon the level of collegiality
that exists in them.

The related literature points out

that this is possible by involving people in problem
solving and decision making practices.

Through

involvement, individuals gain a sense of dignity,
respect and partnership that leads to gains in
productivity in the search for excellence.

CHAPTER III
Methodology
The "Year of Education," in Illinois was 1985.
In June of that year, the Illinois General assembly
enacted Senate Bill 730 and House Bill 1070.

Jointly,

these two pieces of legislation brought about, or
proposed to bring about, sweeping changes in education
throughout the State.

The package of educational

reform bills was enacted into law on July 18, 1985 when
both bills were signed by Governor James Thompson.
Among the provisions of Senate Bill 730 was a
compensation study and the establishment of the Center
for Excellence in Teaching.

The legislation

appropriated $3,500,000 in grants for the development
of pilot studies of career compensation programs in
five to seven Illinois school districts.

The Bill

further called upon such programs to, "provide
compensation for extraordinary teaching, innovation,
leadership or assumption of additional
responsibilities.

They may include extended teacher

contracts, career ladder or performance based pay. 1166
The Act further called upon the Center for

66 Ted Sanders, S.B. 730, H.B. 1070 (Springfield,
Il.: Illinois State Board of Education, June, 1985),
Topic #61.
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Excellence in Teaching to report upon the success of
such programs to the Joint Education Committee of the·
Legislature, the governor, and the General Assembly by
December 31, 1986.

The State Board of Education was to

further recommend to the General Assembly the need to
revise sections of the legislation or if any of the
pilot programs should be extended to all Illinois
schools districts.

On December 9, 1985 the Illinois

State Board of Education issued a request for proposals
to all Illinois school districts for submission of
proposals in compliance with Senate Bill 730.

School

districts had until January 22, 1986 to submit
proposals for compensation plans.
In April of 1987, the forty member "Blue Ribbon
Committee on the Improvement of Teaching as a
Profession'' released its preliminary conclusions and
recommendations.

The Committee was comprised of

members from both the education community and the
general public.

Established jointly by the Illinois

State Board of Education and the Board of Higher
Education, the Committee's task was to make
recommendations, appropriate to Illinois, that would
improve the nature of teaching. Recommendation
twenty-five read,
The State Board of Education should seek funding
for continuation of the study of teacher career
compensation issues, with special emphasis on
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programs which respond to public concerns about
acknowledging excellence and rewarding results or
productivity in teaching. The continued study of
compensation issues should build on activities now
in place in Illinois and should consider
how to do at least the following:
a.) Identify and reward superior teaching
b.) Reward teachers, either individually or on a
school-by-school bg,is for the learning performance
of their students.
Recommendation twenty-six stated, "The State
Board of Education should initiate the establishment,
through public or private funds, a unique means for
recognizing and rewarding extraordinary teachers. 1168
In the Summer of 1987, the Illinois State Board
of Education was contacted in order to identify
Illinois school districts that employed merit pay
systems for teachers.

A list of twenty-one Illinois

school districts using merit pay systems was obtained
from the State Board of Education.

Of those twenty-one

districts, seventeen were K-8 districts, three were
9-12 districts and one was a unit district.

In an

attempt to limit the study to the Chicago metropolitan
area, it was found that most plans were in actuality
career ladder plans or were no longer operational.

67 Ted Sanders, "Announcement of Public Hearings
on the Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Blue Ribbon On The Improvement of Teaching As A
Profession"( Springfield, IL.: Illinois State Board of
Education, April 9, 1987), p.11.
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only two of the K-8 districts contacted that had
operational merit pay plans agreed to participate in
this study.
The final selection of the merit pay schools in
this study was made by the superintendents of the two
merit pay school districts that agreed to participate.
The selection of the non-merit pay schools was also
made by the superintendents of the non-merit pay
districts.

Of the four schools in the study, school

populations ranged between 300 and 480 students.

Three

of the schools were K-5 schools and one non-merit pay
school was a K-6 school.
each school varied.

The number of teachers at

The largest number of teachers

were found at the merit pay schools, with the
principals reporting teaching populations of
approximately thirty teachers at each school.

The

non-merit pay principals reported teaching populations
between twenty and twenty-five teachers.

All of the

schools in the study were within ten miles of each
other, three of the schools were in neighboring,
contiguous school districts.
In the fall of 1987, Professor Wayne K. Hoy of
Rutgers University was contacted with regard to
securing permission to utilize the Organizational
Climate Description Questionnaire - RE for the purposes
of this study.

Professor Hoy granted permission to use
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the OCDQ-RE with the stipulation that his article
regarding the development of the instrument be
referenced, in addition to sharing the research results
of the study with him.
In early May, 1988 the copies of the OCDQ-RE as
well as demographic data sheets were delivered to each
of the participating schools in the study.

Surveys

were distributed to the faculties of each school by the
principals.

Eleven days after the OCDQ-RE was

delivered to each school they were picked up by the
researcher.

Two weeks after the initial collection of

research data, in an effort to increase the response
rate, additional copies of the instrument and
demographic data sheet were delivered to the schools.
Included in the follow-up were return postage envelopes
that would enable teachers not completing the initial
survey to mail their response directly to the
researcher.
The data from the OCDQ-RE responses and the
demographic data sheets were tabulated for the purposes
of eliciting mean numerical scores for each item.

The

mean scores for each item were then summed to produce a
school score for each subtest of the OCDQ-RE.

The

higher the score for each subtest, the stronger the
element in the school, whether it be teacher
collegiality, teacher intimacy, teacher disengagement,
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and principal support, principal directiveness, or
principal restrictiveness.
The sample for this study consisted of four
elementary schools from Du Page County, Illinois.
Du Page County is a suburban county lying directly west
of the city of Chicago.

Of the four schools included

in the sample, two schools were merit pay schools and
two were non-merit pay schools.

A demographic sketch

of each of the schools in the study is as follows:
School A
School A is a merit pay school employing 32
teachers.

Student population is approximately 300

students in grades kindergarten through five.

A total

of thirteen teachers completed responses for the
purposes of this study.
School B
School B is also a merit pay school and employs
30 teachers.

Student population is approximately 470

students in grades kindergarten through five.

A total

of twenty-two teachers completed responses for this
research.
School C
School C is a non-merit pay school that employs
25 teachers.

Student population in this kindergarten

through sixth grade school is approximately 470
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students.

A total of sixteen teachers completed both

the OCDQ-RE and demographic survey used in this study.·
School D
School D is also a non-merit pay school.
Student population in this kindergarten through fifth
grade school is approximately 380 students.
faculty consists of 23 teachers.

The

Fifteen teachers

completed the two research instruments utilized in this
study.
In keeping with the design of Hoy's OCDQ-RE, the
appropriate unit of analysis in the study of
organizational climate is the school, not the
individual.

Therefore, individual scores for each

subtest of the OCDQ-RE were computed, individual scores
were totaled and divided by the total number of school
building responses to produce mean scores for each
subtest of the OCDQ-RE.

Also in keeping with the

design of the instrument, comparisons were made between
groups in the sample since norms for the OCDQ-RE have
not been established.

A t test was performed to test

the differences between groups and to assist in seeking
the answers to the following research questions:
1.

Is the organizational climate in merit pay
schools less open than that in non-merit
pay schools?

2.

Are principals in merit pay schools less
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open than principals in non-merit pay
schools?
3.

Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more
collegial than teachers in merit pay
schools?

4.

Are principals in merit pay schools more
directive?

5.

Are principals in merit pay schools less
supportive?

6.

Are merit pay principals more restrictive
than non-merit pay principals?

7.

Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than
non-merit pay teachers?

8.

Do teachers in merit pay schools exhibit
more intimate behavior than teachers in
non-merit pay schools?

CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF DATA
As previously discussed, a total of sixty-six
teachers responded to the two instruments used in this
study.

At School A, a merit pay school, thirteen of

thirty-two teachers completed the instruments.
respondents were female.

All

Six teachers held a Master's

degree, all others held a Bachelor's degree.

All but

two of the teachers were members of the National
Education Association.

Three teachers had 0 -5 years

teaching experience: three had 6-10 years experience:
two teachers had 11-15 years of experience: three had
between 16-20 years experience, and two teachers had
more than 20 years of experience.

Ten of the

respondents were married, two were single and one was
divorced.
At School B, the second merit pay school,
twenty-two of the school's thirty teachers completed
the OCDQ-RE and demographic surveys.

Three teachers

had 0-5 years experience: ten had 6-10 years teaching
experience: four had 11-16 years experience: another
three had 16-20 years experience, and two had taught
for more than 20 years.

All respondents were female.

Sixteen teachers were members of the American
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Federation of Teachers, six had no union affiliation.
Fifteen respondents were married, six were single, one
was divorced.

Thirteen teachers held a Bachelor's

degree, and nine had Master's degrees.
Of the sixteen teachers completing surveys at
School C, a non-merit pay school, one had 0-5 years
teaching experience; two had 6-10 years of experience;
eight had taught for 11-15 years; three had 16-20 years
teaching experience, and two had taught for more than
twenty years.

All respondents were female, twelve of

whom were married, the remaining four were single.
Thirteen of the sixteen School C respondents were
members of the National Education Association.

Five

teachers held Bachelor's degrees, ten held a Master's
degree, and one teacher had a PhD.
At School D, fifteen of the twenty-three faculty
members completed the surveys used in this study.

Two

teachers had 0-5 years teaching experience; seven had
taught between 6-10 years; four teachers had 11-15
years of experience, and two had taught for more than
20 years.

Fourteen teachers were National Association

of Education members.

Ten teachers were married, four

were single, and one was divorced.

Five teachers had

Master's degrees, all others held Bachelor's degrees.
One of the School D respondents was male.
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TABLE 1
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BY SCHOOL

DEMOGRAPHIC

SCHOOL
A

B

c

D

0- 5 YRS. EXPERIENCE

3

3

1

2

6-10 YRS. EXPERIENCE

3

10

2

7

11-15 YRS. EXPERIENCE

2

4

8

4

16-20 YRS. EXPERIENCE

3

3

3

0

20+

2

2

2

2

0

0

0

1

13

22

16

14

BACHELOR'S DEGREE

7

13

5

11

MASTER'S DEGREE

6

9

10

5

DOCTOR'S DEGREE

0

0

1

0

11

16

13

14

2

6

3

1

10

15

12

14

UNMARREID TEACHERS

2

6

3

1

DIVORCED TEACHERS

1

1

0

1

13

22

16

15

ITEM

YRS. EXPERIENCE

MALE TEACHERS
FEMALE TEACHERS

UNION MEMBERS
NON-UNION MEMBERS
MARRIED TEACHERS

TOTAL RESPONSES

For the purpose of this study, a total of eight
research questions were developed dealing with the
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organizational climate of merit pay and non-merit pay
schools.

One of the primary functions of the study was

to determine the openness of the organizational
climates of both types of schools.

Secondly, a t

test

was performed on the composite scores for each subtest
of the OCDQ-RE for various groups in the study.

A

significance level of .OS was determined as appropriate
for acceptance.

The first research question posed, "Is

the organizational climate in merit pay schools less
open than that of non-merit pay schools?", seeks to
determine if differences in openness levels exists in
the two types of schools studied.

Using the

Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - RE,
an openness index for faculty relations, in each school
in the study was computed. The openness index for each
school is computed for faculty relations by summing the
standard scores for the collegial and intimate subtests
of the OCDQ-RE and subtracting from the total the score
for the disengaged subtest.

The openness indices for

each of the four schools are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL AND SCHOOL TYPE

School A (merit pay)

SCHOOL SCORE

-1.16
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School B (merit pay)

-1.17

School C (non-merit pay)

-1.37

School D (non-merit pay)

-1.29

As illustrated in Table 2, the openness indices
for both of the merit pay schools were slightly higher
than those of the two non-merit pay schools.

The two

merit pay schools had openness indices of -1.16 (School
A) and -1.17 (School

B)~

while the two non-merit pay

schools had indices of -1.37 (School C) and -1.29
(School D) respectively.
In addition to creating openness indices for
each individual school for faculty relations, the
schools were grouped by types and an openness index was
developed for faculty relations accordingly.

Table 3

shows the openness indices for faculty relations for
merit pay and non-merit pay schools by school type.
TABLE 3
OPENNESS INDICES FOR FACULTY RELATIONS BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPES

SCORE

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

-1.165
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NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

-1.331

Once again the standard scores indicate a
slightly higher degree of openness in the area of
faculty relations in the merit pay schools as opposed
to the non-merit pay schools.
In addition to establishing an openness index
for faculty relations in each school, an openness index
was also computed for principal behavior as perceived
by teachers in keeping with the second research
question, "Are principals in merit pay schools less
open than principals in non-merit pay schools?"
Openness indices for principal behavior for each of the
schools studied are shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
OPENNESS INDICES FOR PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL AND TYPE

SCHOOL SCORE

School A (Merit Pay)

3.49

School B (Merit Pay)

1.59

School C (Non-Merit Pay)

4.38

School D (Non-Merit Pay)

3.23
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As depicted in Table 4, the standardized scores
for openness of principal behavior illustrates that the
most open principal behavior is found in one of the two
non-merit pay schools (School C) with a standardized
score of 4.38.

However, the next highest score for

principal behavior, 3.49, was found in School A, a
merit pay school.

A standard score of 3.23 was found

in School D a non-merit pay school.

The second merit

pay school, School B, had the lowest standardized score
of 1.59.
As with faculty relations, the schools were
grouped by type, merit pay and non-merit pay, and
standardized scores were computed for principal
behavior and are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
OPENNESS INDICES FOR PRINCIPAL BEHAVIOR BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPE

SCORE

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

2.29

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

3.38

The grouped scores indicate that the non-merit
pay schools had a combined higher degree of open
principal behavior than did the merit pay schools.
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What factors help to determine the degree of
openness in each school?
around six dimensions.

The OCDQ-RE is structured
Together, these six dimensions

help to determine the openness of a school's
organizational climate.

Three dimensions, collegial,

intimate and disengagement aid in determining the
openness of faculty relations.

The three dimensions

that help to determine the openness of principal
behavior are supportive, directive and restrictive.
Accordingly, research questions were generated for each
of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE.
Faculty Collegial Behavior
The third research question of this study deals
with collegial behavior of faculty members, it asks,
"Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more collegial
than teachers in merit pay schools?"

The OCDQ-RE

consists of eight items that deal with the collegial
dimension, which may be defined as consisting of
behavior among staff members that is supportive and
professional.

Generally, teachers elicit pride in

their schools and enjoy working with their peers, they
feel fulfilled and display enthusiasm and a positive
attitude toward the school, their colleagues and
profession.

The eight items of the OCDQ-RE that help

to determine collegial behavior of faculty members are
shown in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
COLLEGIAL ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

1

ITEM

The teachers accomplish their work with
vim, vigor and pleasure.

6*

Teachers leave school immediately after
school is over.

12

Most of the teachers here accept the
faults of their colleagues.

19

Teachers help and support each other.

26

Teachers are proud of their school

32

New teachers are readily accepted by their
colleagues.

37*

Teachers socialize together in small,
select groups.

40

Teachers respect the professional
competence of their colleagues

* scored negatively

Composite mean scores for the collegial dimension
of the OCDQ-RE are shown in Table 7 by school types.
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TABLE 7
COMPOSITE COLLEGIAL SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

25.75

901.23

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

25.71

797.00

*Sum= total of individual responses
Examination of the composite collegial scores
indicates that, when grouped, the strength of the
collegial property in both types of schools is similar.
Table 8 further breaks down the composite collegial
scores by individual schools.
TABLE 8
COLLEGIAL COMPOSITE SCORES BY INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL

MEAN

SCHOOL

RESPONSES

School A (merit pay)

24.84

13

School B (merit pay)

26.04

22

(non-merit pay)

25.87

16

School D (non-merit pay)

24.60

15

Total

25.43

66

School

c
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For the purposes of this study, the statistical
treatment involved the computation of mean scores for
each of the six subtests of the OCDQ-RE produced by the
various groups participating in the study.

A t test

was applied to the data to determine differences
between the scores produced by each group.

It was

determined that through the t test, a level of .OS or
beyond would be reported as significant.
Analysis of the data between school types on the
collegial dimension of the OCDQ-RE revealed no
significant differences in collegiality between merit
pay and non-merit pay schools.

Analysis between

individual schools did not reveal a statistically
significant difference in collegiality between any of
the schools participating in the study.

While there

appear to be differences in the collegial composite
scores of the OCDQ-RE between individual schools, when
the schools are grouped by type no significant
differences in the strengths of the collegial
properties can be detected.

It is important to note

however, that School B, a merit pay school, produced
the strongest collegial score of all the schools in the
study.
In addition to analyzing the data between schools
and school types, the data were also analyzed by
teaching experience levels and union affiliation.
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Examination of the data for the collegial dimension of
the OCDQ-RE revealed no significant differences between
teachers at the varying strata of teaching experience
or between those teachers who held union membership and
their colleagues who were not members of teacher's
unions.
However, analysis of the data between teachers
with varying levels of teaching experience did reveal
some significant differences between teachers with 0-5
years of experience and their colleagues with 20 plus
years of experience.

The results revealed that the

teachers with 20 plus years classroom experience
maintained a higher level of collegiality than their
less experienced peers.

Teachers with 0-5 years

experience produced a composite mean score of 23.22 on
the collegial subtest, while their colleagues with more
than twenty years of teaching experience had a
composite mean of 27.50.

A significant difference was

found to exist between the two groups.
Principal Directive Behavior
The fourth research question in this study deals
with the directive dimension of principal behavior and
asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools more
directive than principals in non-merit pay schools?"
The question has relevance in that it seeks to
determine the rigidity and distance that principals
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keep between themselves and their teaching personnel.
Principals who are directive seek to maintain a high
degree of control over teachers and the activities of
the school.

Directive principals may be seen as

autocratic and monitor even the most minute aspects of
the school environment.

They tend not to be concerned

with the interpersonal relationships they have with
their teachers.
The directive dimension of principal behavior of
the OCDQ-RE is determined through the utilization of
nine items in the instrument.

These items are

delineated in Table 9.
TABLE 9
DIRECTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

ITEM

5

The principal rules with an iron fist.

10

The principal checks the sign-in sheet
every morning.

17

The principal schedules the work for the
teachers.

24

The principal corrects teachers' mistakes.

30

The principal closely checks classroom
(teacher) activities.
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35

The principal checks lesson plans.

39

The principal is autocratic.

40

The principal monitors everything teachers
do.

Scoring of the OCDQ-RE on the directive dimension
of principal behavior by school types is illustrated in
Table 10.

The two merit pay schools produced a mean

score of 25.48, while the mean score for the two
non-merit pay schools was 15.87.

The results of data

analysis through the application of a t test revealed a
significant difference between the two types of
schools.
TABLE 10
COMPOSITE DIRECTIVE DIMENSION SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

25.48**

928.33

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

15.87**

507.08

*Sum

=

total of individual responses

**Statistically significant
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As shown in Table 11, a breakdown by individual
schools indicates that School B, a merit pay school
scored a great deal higher than the other three schools
in the study including School A the other merit pay
school.

This score indicates that the highest level of

principal directive behavior was found in a merit pay
school.
TABLE 11
DIRECTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOLS

SCHOOL

MEAN

RESPONSES

School A (Merit Pay)

18.00**

13

School B (Merit Pay)

29.91**

22

(Non-Merit Pay)

12.37**

16

School D (Non-Merit Pay)

19.60**

15

Total

20.97

66

School

c

**Statistically significant
The application of a t test, revealed a
significant difference in the scores between the two
merit pay schools, Schools A and B.

Analysis of the

individual school data also revealed a significant
difference between School A and B, both merit pay
schools and School C, a non-merit pay school.

Also, a
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statistically significant difference exsisted between
School B and School D, the second non-merit pay school
in the study. Finally, a significant difference was
revealed in the scores between the two non-merit pay
schools, Schools C and D.
Data analysis was also performed on the directive
composite scores by union affiliation and length of
teaching experience.

No significant differences

between teacher groups based upon union membership and
non-union membership could be found.

These results

were consistent when the data was analyzed based upon
length of teaching experience.

On the directive

subtest, union members produced a composite mean score
of 21.11 while the composite mean score for non-union
members was 20.38.

Composite mean scores for the

various strata of teaching experience revealed a score
of 21.22 for those with 0-5 years experience: 23.36 for
teachers having 6-10 years experience: 19.00 for those
with 11-15 years of teaching experience: 20.22 for
teachers with 16-20 years experience, and 19.37 for
those teachers having taught more than twenty years.
Although a comment section was not included as
part of the data collection, three of the twenty-two
teachers responding to the survey from School B made
hand written comments under item ten of the
Questionnaire.

The item asked respondents to circle
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the appropriate response to the statement, "The
principal checks the sign-in sheet every morning."
It appears from a majority of the responses from School
B, that the school did not utilize a sign-in sheet
procedure for teacher attendance.

However, one of the

teacher respondents made the following comment to item
ten," •••• is extremely aware of who is late or on time."
Another teacher replied to the statement by
writing,"N/A" and then wrote,"But does manage to have a
sense of whether staff are on time."

A third School B

teacher wrote, "No sign-in sheet but (name deleted) is
aware of what time you arrive!"
The comments made by these three School B staff
members may be considered indicators as to why the
directive dimension at School B was stronger than at
the other three schools in the study.

Although there

were no significant differences discovered through
statistical analysis of the data, the composite score
on the directive subtest for School B (29.91), clearly
indicates a much stronger directive dimension for
principal behavior at this school when compared to the
other schools.
Principal Supportive Behavior
Another dimension of principal behavior is the
basis of the fifth research question in this study.
The question asks, "Are principals in merit pay schools
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less supportive?"

Principals who are supportive enjoy

positive interpersonal relationships with their staffs.
The rapport between teachers and principal is genuine.
Both teachers and the principal work together as a team
to establish goals and willingly accept suggestions and
feedback from each other.
unhindered.

Communication is two way and

Teachers are provided with genuine,

frequent, yet authentic praise and all criticism is
constructive in nature.
The Organizational Climate Description
Questionnaire - RE, contains nine items that deal with
the supportive dimension of principal behavior.

The

nine items appear in Table 12.
TABLE 12
SUPPORTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS ON THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

4

ITEM

The principal goes out of his/her way to
help teachers.

9
15

The principal uses constructive criticism.
The principal explains his/her reason for
criticism to teachers.

16

The principal listens to and accepts
teachers' suggestions.
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22

The principal looks out for the personal
welfare of teachers.

23

The principal treats teachers as equals.

28

The principal compliments teachers.

29

The principal is easy to understand.

42

The principal goes out of his/her way to
show appreciation to teachers.

As with the other dimensions of the OCDQ-RE,
composite mean scores were computed for the supportive
dimension of principal behavior by school type.

The

non-merit pay schools produced a stronger dimension of
supportive principal behavior than did the merit pay
schools.

The non-merit pay school composite score

score was 16.80, while the merit pay school composite
mean score was 12.71.

Composite mean scores by school

type are shown in Table 13.
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TABLE 13
COMPOSITE SUPPORTIVE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SCHOOL TYPE

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

12.71**

444.99

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

16.80**

530.99

*Sum = total of individual responses
**Statistically significant
When viewed separately by individual schools, the
picture developed in Table 13 tends to hold true to
form for the individual schools.

The two non-merit pay

schools were consistent in that their composite mean
scores were stronger than either of the two merit pay
schools.

School C had the strongest supportive

dimension of principal behavior with a composite mean
score of 17.00.

School D also a non-merit pay school,

had a composite mean score of 16.60 for the supportive
dimension.
The supportive composite mean scores for principal
behavior on the OCDQ-RE for the merit pay schools was
14.84 for School A and 11.45 for School B.

The

individual composite mean scores for supportive
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principal behavior for all schools participating in the
study are illustrated in Table 14.
TABLE 14
SUPPORTIVE COMPOSITE SCORE BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL

MEAN

RESPONSES

School A (Merit Pay)

14.84**

13

School B (Merit Pay)

11.45**

22

(Non-Merit Pay)

17.00**

16

School D (Non-Merit Pay)

16.60**

15

Total

14.63

66

School

c

**Statistically significant
Statistical analysis of the data revealed a
significant difference in mean supportive dimension
scores between types of schools beyond the acceptance
level of .05.

Likewise when a t test was applied to

the individual school scores, some significant
differences between various groups in the study were
found.

A significant difference was found to exist

between the two merit pay schools.
stronger supportive dimension.

School A showing a

Additionally, School A
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differed significantly from School C.

A significant

difference was also detected between School B, a merit
pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay school.
Finally, a statistically significant difference was
also found to exist between School B and School D, the
second non-merit pay school in the study.
When analyzed by union affiliation, no significant
differences were found to exist between teachers who
were union members and their non-union counterparts.
However, when a t test was performed on the data
between groups at various levels of teaching
experience, a statistically significant difference in
scores was found to exist between teachers with 0-5
years experience and those with 20 plus years of
experience.

Those teachers possessing 20 plus years

experience elicited the stronger score.

Teachers with

0-5 years experience had a mean score of 12.77, those
with more than twenty years experience produced a mean
score of 16.50.

Likewise, a significant difference

existed between teachers with 11-15 years experience
and those with 16-20 years experience, those having the
fewer number of years experience producing the higher
score.

Those teachers having taught 11-15 years

produced a mean of 15.38, those teachers in the 16-20
year group produced a mean of 12.88, a significant
difference between the two groups was detected.

Also,
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those with 16-20 years experience and those with 20
plus years experience differed significantly, once
again the 20 plus years group produced the higher
score.

Those teachers in the 16-20 year group had a

mean score on the supportive dimension of 12.88, while
those with

twenty or more years experience had a mean

score of 16.50.
As previously mentioned, a comment section to this
study was not included in the data gathering.

However,

as with the directive dimension previously discussed, a
teacher from School B made a comment that refers to
elements of supportive principal behavior at the end of
the survey.

The comment related that the principal

utilized various methods to show appreciation to staff
members through such activities as birthday cards,
breakfasts and luncheons for special occasions and
"upbeat cards."

But the respondent wrote, "Then

sabotages these attempts with the way (name deleted)
handles people day-to-day."

This statement may serve

to explain why the supportive dimension of
organizational climate at School B was the weakest of
the four schools in the study.
Principal Restrictive Behavior
The third dimension of principal behavior that the
OCDQ-RE addresses is restrictive behavior.

Principals

who exhibit restrictive behavior have a high degree of
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concern for following established policies and
procedures.
to them.

Administrative detail is of great concern

Principals who are restrictive seldom permit

or encourage teacher participation in decision making
and, as a consequence, stifle creativity in approaching
ways to solve school problems.

In conclusion,

principals who display restrictive behavior, frequently
burden other members of the school staff with a number
of non-teaching related activities, such as committee
responsibilites and burdensome paperwork.
In an effort to detect any differences in
restrictive behavior on the part of merit pay and
non-merit pay principals, the sixth research question
in this study asked, "Are merit pay principals more
restrictive than non-merit pay principals?"

The

structure of the Organizational Climate Description
Questionnaire - RE is such that it consists of five
items that deal with assessing restrictive principal
behavior.

Those items on the OCDQ-RE that deal with

restrictve principal behavior are shown in Table 15.
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TABLE 15
RESTRICTIVE DIMENSION ITEMS OF PRINCIPAL
BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

11

ITEM

Routine duties interfere with the job of
teaching.

18

Teachers have too many committee
requirements.

25

Administrative paperwork is burdensome at
this school.

31*

Clerical support reduces teachers'
paperwork.

36

Teachers are burdened with paperwork.

*scored negatively

The composite mean scores for both the merit pay
and non-merit pay schools were computed for restrictive
principal behavior.

The two merit pay schools in the

study had a composite mean score of 12.54.

The

non-merit pay schools mean composite was 12.48.

The

composite mean scores indicate a slightly stronger
restrictive behavior property for the two merit pay
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schools.

Table 16 shows the composite mean scores for

both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools that
participated in this study.
TABLE 16
RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE MEAN SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

12.54

463.61

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

12.48

388.66

*Sum

= total

of individual responses

Individual school scores for restrictive behavior
of principals were also computed and are illustrated in
Table 17.
TABLE 17
RESTRICTIVE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL

MEAN

RESPONSES

School A (Merit Pay)

11.23**

13

School B (Merit Pay)

13.31**

22

School C (Non-Merit Pay)

10.56**

16

School D (Non-merit Pay)

14.53**

15
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Total

66

12.52

**Statistically significant
The composite mean scores for individual schools
illustrate that the most restrictive principal behavior
was evident in School D, a non-merit pay school.
composite mean score for that school was 14.53.

The
School

B, a merit pay school, had the second strongest
restrictive score, 13.31.

A composite restrictive

score of 11.23 was produced by School A, a merit pay
school, the third strongest score.

The lowest level of

restrictive behavior was found to exist at School D
whose mean score on the restrictive subtest was 10.56.
School D is a non-merit pay school.
Statistical analysis of the data was performed by
school types, merit pay vis-a-vis non-merit pay schools
to compare mean scores.

When grouped, the merit pay

teachers produced a mean score of 12.54.

The non-merit

pay teachers produced a mean score of 12.48.

Analysis

of the data for the two groups revealed no significant
differences.

When schools were compared for

differences between one another for restrictive
principal behavior, there was found to be a
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statistically significant difference in scores between
School A and School B, both merit pay schools.

Also,·a

significant difference was found to exist between
School A and School D.

School D a non-merit pay school

having a higher restrictive property for principal
behavior.

A significant difference was also found to

exist between School B and School

c.

Finally, the

scores of the two non-merit pay schools also differed
significantly.
When further analysis was performed on the data, a
significant difference beyond the .OS level of
acceptance established for this study for restrictive
principal behavior, was found to exist among teachers
who were members of unions, as opposed to their
non-union counterparts.

Teachers having union

affiliation produced a composite mean score of 12.90
compared with a score of 10.92 for non-union members.
As stated, the stronger perceived restrictive property
held by the union teachers differed significantly from
their non-union counterparts.

However, when comparing

differences based upon varying levels of teaching
experience, 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20
years and 20 plus years of experience, no significant
differences were noted.
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Teacher Disengagement
Teachers who display disengaged behavior are thos·e
who take little personal interest in their school, or
in the personal lives of their colleagues.

Disengaged

teachers also display little professional interest.
Such teachers merely mark time on the job and lend
little support to effective team building.
Consequently, they lack common goal orientation and
have a negative effect upon their colleagues and the
school.

Hoy's Organizational Climate Description

_Questionnaire-RE contains four items designed to assess
the level of disengagement within a school organization
and addresses the seventh research question, "Are merit
pay teachers more disengaged than non-merit pay
teachers?"

The four items designed to assess the

disengagement dimension of faculty behavior are
illustrated in Table 18.
TABLE 18
DISENGAGED ITEMS OF TEACHER BEHAVIOR ON THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

3
18

ITEM

Faculty meetings are useless.
There is a minority group of teachers who
always oppose the majority.
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14

Teachers exert group pressure on nonconforming faculty members.

21

Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty
meetings.

Composite mean scores for disengaged teacher
behavior were computed by school types and are
illustrated in Table 19.
TABLE 19
COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

7.71**

269.99

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

6.73**

208.86

*Sum

=

total of individual responses

**Statistically significant
Disengaged behavior on the part of faculty members
at the merit pay schools is stronger than at the
non-merit pay schools.

As Table 19 illustrates, the

merit pay school teachers produced a composite mean
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score of 7.71, while their non-merit pay school
counterparts produced a mean score of 6.73 on the
disengaged subtest.

Application of a t test to the

data, revealed a significant difference between the two
groups.
In addition to computing scores by school types,
individual school scores for faculty disengagement were
also developed.

The individual school scores are

revealed in Table 20 and show that School B, a merit
pay building, had the strongest disengagement score of
7.95.
TABLE 20
COMPOSITE DISENGAGED SCORES BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL

MEAN

RESPONSES

School A (Merit Pay)

7.30

13

School B (Merit Pay)

7.95**

22

(Non-Merit Pay)

5.75**

16

School D (Non-Merit Pay)

7.73**

15

Total

7.24

66

School

c

**Statistically significant
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Although a merit pay school produced the highest
composite score of the four schools in the study, a
non-merit pay school, School D, produced the second
highest score for disengagement (7.73),

just slightly

stronger than the 7.30 composite score produced by
School A, a merit pay school.

The weakest score, or

the most engaged faculty was found to exist in School
C, a non-merit pay school, whose composite score was
5.75.
Through the utilization of a t test the composite
scores of each school were compared for differences
between individual schools.

A level of significance

beyond the .OS level was found to exist between School
B, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit pay
school, when comparing their scores.

Likewise, a

significant difference existed between the two
non-merit pay schools for faculty disengagement.

No

significant differences in disengagement were detected
however, between non-union teachers and their fellow
teachers who were affiliated with either the National
Education Association or the American Federation of
Teachers. Union faculty in the study produced a
disengagement mean score of 7.39.

The thirteen

non-union teachers who took part in the study had a
composite mean score of 6.61.

A t test applied to this

data revealed no significant differences between the
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two groups.

When mean scores for disengagement were

compared between teachers at various levels of teaching
experience, some significance was detected in analysis
of the data.

Teachers with 0-5 years experience

produced a mean score of 8.44 when compared to teachers
with 11-15 years experience whose mean was 6.44, a
significant difference between the scores of the two
groups was noted.

Analysis of the data between all

other strata of teaching experience did not yield any
significant differences between teachers at all other
levels of experience analyzed in this study.
Intimacy
When teachers get to know one another well and
socialize with each other, both in and out of the work
place, their level of intimate behavior within the
organization increases and has a corresponding impact
on the organizational climate of the school.

In many

instances, teachers become personal friends.

When

intimate behavior on the part of teachers permeates the
organizational climate of a school, the result can be
the development of a social support network among
faculty members.

The eighth and final question asks,

"Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit more
intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay schools?"
The Organizational Climate Description
Questionnaire-RE contains seven items dealing with the
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social interactions and relationships that teachers in
a school may have with one another.

Those items that·

appear in the OCDQ-RE that play a role in the
assessment of intimate behavior of teachers are shown
in Table 21.
TABLE 21
INTIMATE ITEMS OF THE OCDQ-RE

ITEM NUMBER

2

ITEM

Teachers' closest friends are other
faculty members at this school.

7

Teachers invite other faculty members to
visit them at home.

13

Teachers know the family background of
other faculty members.

20

Teachers have fun socializing together
during school time.

27

Teachers have parties for each other.

33

Teachers socialize with each other on a
regular basis.

38

Teachers provide strong social support for
colleagues.
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Computation of mean scores by school types
revealed that the two merit pay schools had stronger
levels of intimate behavior than did the non-merit pay
schools.

The composite scores by school type for

intimate teacher behavior are shown in Table 22.
TABLE 22
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL TYPE

MEAN

SCHOOL TYPE

SUM*

MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

20.31**

710.99

NON-MERIT PAY SCHOOLS

17.71**

549.19

*Sum = total of individual responses
**Statistically significant
The 20.31 composite score produced by the merit
pay faculty members, indicates that the overall social,
intimacy network operating in those schools was
stronger than that in the two non-merit pay schools
whose mean score on the intimate behavior subtest was
17.71.

When computed by individual schools, the

results were consistent with those produced by school
types.

Table 23 shows the composite intimate scores

for each individual school in the study.
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TABLE 23
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY SCHOOL

SCHOOL

MEAN

RESPONSES

School A (Merit Pay)

20.69**

13

School B (Merit Pay)

20.09**

22

(Non-Merit Pay)

15.81**

16

School D (Non-Merit Pay)

18.40**

15

Total

18.78

66

School

c

**Statistically significant
The results of computing the individual school
mean scores for intimate faculty behavior indicate that
the merit pay schools had consistently higher, and thus
stronger, intimate behavior.

The results of this

aspect of the study illustrate that with mean scores of
20.69 and 20.09 respectively, Schools A and B had
developed a stronger social support network for faculty
members.

School D, a non-merit pay school, produced a

mean score of 18.40, while School C produced the
weakest score for intimate behavior at 15.81.
The data for intimate behavior by school type was
statistically analyzed and revealed a significant
difference between merit pay and non-merit pay schools.
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In addition to analysis by school type, the data was
analyzed by individual schools.

The individual school·

analysis revealed that a difference existed between
School A, a merit pay school, and School C, a non-merit
pay school, beyond the .OS level of acceptance for
significance for intimate behavior.

School A also

differed significantly from School D.

School B, the

second merit pay school, differed significantly from
School C a non-merit pay school.

Finally, the scores

of the two non-merit pay schools differed from one
another at a level of significance beyond the .OS level
of acceptance for intimate behavior.
TABLE 24
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY EXPERIENCE

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

MEAN

s

18.88

6-10

18.72

11-lS

19.0S

16-20

16.66

20+

20.62

0-

Statistical analysis was also performed on the
data by years of teaching experience at various
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stratas.

When comparing teachers with varying levels

of experience, no significant differences at or below
the .05 level could be found.

Teachers having 0-5

years teaching experience had a composite mean score
for intimacy of 18.88.

While those with 6-10 years

experience produced a mean score of 18.72.

More

experienced teachers with 11-15 years of service had an
intimacy score of 19.05; those with 16-20 years in the
classroom produced a mean of 16.66, and those with more
than twenty years experience had a mean score of 20.62.
Although those with the most experience produced the
highest intimacy property no significant differences
between any of the groups was noted at or below the .05
level of significance.

Finally, when the data was

analyzed by union and non-union affiliation, no
significant differences in the level of intimate
behavior could be found between teachers of either
group.

The fifty-three teachers affiliated with a

teacher's union produced an intimate composite mean
score of 19.22.

Their non-union counterparts had a

mean score of 17.00.
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Summary
The data examined in this chapter reveals that fo·r
the most part the organizational climates of merit pay
and non-merit pay schools are similar in nature.

Both

the openness indices for faculty relations and
principal behavior do not vary greatly.

When viewed

from an individual school perspective, greater variance
in the scores was detected between one of the two merit
pay schools in the study (School B), and the other
three schools that included another merit pay facility.
When examining the data elicited by the six
subtests of organizational climate, once again similar
patterns emerge.

Some differences in the level of

collegial behavior between teachers with varying levels
of classroom experience existed.

Those teachers with

0-5 years teaching experience had mean score of 23.22.
Their more experienced colleagues with twenty plus
years of experience had a composite mean score of
27.50.

The difference between the two groups was found

to be significant.

However, no differences were found

between types of schools.

Nor could any differences be

found between teachers based upon union affiliation.
The data for directive principal behavior revealed
a significant difference between the scores of the
merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

Significant

differences were also found in the subtest scores for
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restrictive principal behavior between the individual
schools in this study.
Analysis of the data for supportive behavior
illustrated stronger supportive behavior at the
non-merit pay schools.

Some consistency of the school

type data (merit pay schools vis-a-vis non-merit pay
schools), was found when the schools were viewed
individually.

Both merit pay schools maintained

significantly lower scores on the supportive subtest
than did School C, a non-merit pay school.
When the data for restrictive principal behavior
was examined by school type, no difference was found to
exist in the perception of merit pay teachers and their
non-merit pay counterparts.

Further analysis of that

same data revealed that some differences existed
between individual schools participating in the study.
Also, a difference in the level of disengagement
beyond the .05 level of acceptance was found to exist
between merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

Further

analysis also revealed that a difference in
disengagement was also present between Schools B and C
and between teachers with 0-5 years teaching experience
and their counterparts with 11-15 years of experience
in the classroom.
Finally, when the data for intimate faculty
behavior was analyzed a difference did exist between
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the merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

Significant

differences were also detected between the two merit
pay schools and School C, but no differences were
detected between the merit pay schools and School D in
their intimacy scores.

Additionally, the scores for

both non-merit pay schools differed significantly.
differences in the scores were found to exist when
comparing scores of groups for union and non-union
affliation, or at the different strata of teaching
experience.
TABLE 25
INTIMATE COMPOSITE SCORES BY UNION MEMBERSHIP

UNION MEMBERSHIP

MEAN

UNION MEMBERS

19.22

NON-UNION MEMBERS

17.00

No

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed in Chapters I and II, since the
publication of a number of national reports calling for
reforms in education, increased attention has been
given to merit pay plans for teachers.

In response to

those calls for the institution of incentive-based pay
programs a number of organizations, including the
country's largest teachers union, have voiced
opposition to such plans.

The result has been the

publication of various elements in the literature that
detail reasons for opposition to such plans that
include, among other things, the development of a
competitive atmosphere among teachers that is generally
viewed as not having a positive impact on school
climate.
The philosophy behind merit pay is that it
serves as a method for rewarding better teachers.
Teachers who perform better than others should be paid
more money.

Because such conditions exist in merit pay

schools, it would follow that concern would develop
over the organizational climate that exists in merit
pay schools as opposed to non-merit pay schools.
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Organizational climate may be seen as the relationships
that teachers experience with their colleagues and
principals.

These relationships help to form the

personality that a school assumes and sets the
educational tone in the school.
In view of the concerns cited above, this study
had as its primary purpose to discern whether or not
any differences existed between the organizational
climates of merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

In

order to determine if such differences existed the
following research questions were considered in the
study:
1.

Is the organizational climate in merit pay

schools less open than that of non-merit pay schools?
2.

Are principals in merit pay schools less

open than principals in non-merit pay schools?
3.

Are teachers in non-merit pay schools more

collegial than merit pay school teachers?
4.

Are principals in merit pay schools more

directive?
5.

Are principals in merit pay school less

supportive?
6.

Are merit pay school principals more

restrictive than non-merit pay school principals?
7.

Are merit pay teachers more disengaged than

non-merit pay school teachers?
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8.

Do teachers in non-merit pay schools exhibit

more intimate behavior than teachers in merit pay
schools?
The population of this study consisted of
sixty-six teachers of four elementary schools from four
different elementary school districts in Du Page
County, Illinois.

In order to elicit data necessary to

the completion of this study, all teachers in each of
the four schools were asked to complete Wayne K. Hoy's,
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE and
a short demographic data sheet.

Scores for openness of

faculty and principal behavior were computed and scores
for each of the six dimensions of the OCDQ-RE were also
computed.

The data was further analyzed and t tests

were run to determine significant differences between
groups.

A significance level of .OS was determined to

be appropriate for significance.
Findings
The research questions in this study fall into
two distinct categories.

The first category deals with

faculty behavior and deals with those elements of
organizational climate attributable to faculty
interactions.

The first, third, seventh, and eighth

research questions focus on faculty aspects of
organizational climate.
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The second category of research questions deals
with elements of organizational climate that may be
attributable to principal behavior.

The second,

fourth, fifth, and sixth research questions focus on
the principal behavior aspect of organizational
climate.

The findings in this study will be reported

based upon the category of each type of research
question.
Faculty Relations
1.

The openness index for faculty relations

indicated that as a group the merit pay schools had a
slightly more open climate than did the non-merit pay
schools.
2.

When viewed as individual schools, the

results were consistent with the first finding, the two
merit schools maintained slightly more open
organizational climates for faculty relations.
3.

On the collegial dimension of organizational

climate the mean scores between types of schools varied
only slightly, with the merit pay schools exhibiting a
slightly stronger collegial dimension.
4.

When mean scores for individual schools were

computed, the results were not totally consistent with
the third finding.

One merit pay school had the

strongest collegial score, while the other merit pay
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school ranked third.

The two non-merit pay schools

ranked second and fourth respectively in collegial
strength.
5.

No significant differences between school

types or individual schools were found on the collegial
dimension.
6.

There were, however, significant differences

between teachers with 0-5 years experience and those
with 20 or more years experience for the collegial
properties: the more senior teachers producing the
stronger score.
7.

On the subtest for disengagement, the

non-merit pay schools had significantly more engaged
faculty members than did the merit pay schools.
8.

As individual schools, the results were not

quite consistent with the school type results.

The

most disengaged faculty was found in one of the merit
pay schools.

However, a non-merit pay school produced

the second strongest disengaged score (7.733 as opposed
to 7.3077 for the second merit pay school in the
study).

The most engaged faculty was found in one of

the merit pay schools.
9. A significant difference was found between
the two non-merit pay schools: School C having the most
engaged faculty.
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10.

Significance was also found between School

B, a merit pay school, and School
11.

c.

Teachers with 11-15 years experience were

found to be more engaged than those with 0-5 years
experience at a level of significance beyond the
established level of .05.
12.

The merit pay schools as a group were found

to have a significantly stronger intimate behavior
property than did the non-merit pay schools.

When

broken down by individual schools, the results for
intimate behavior were consistent.

Both merit pay

schools maintained higher scores for the intimate
behavior subtest.

Significant differences were found

between School A and both of the non-merit pay schools.
School B, a merit pay school, also differed
significantly from School
13.

c.

The scores between the two non-merit pay

schools had a significant difference beyond the
acceptance level of .05.

The School C faculty having

the lower intimate behavior score.
Principal Behavior
1.

The openness indices for principal behavior

by school types showed that the non-merit pay
principals were more open.
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2.

The results in the first finding for

principal behavior were not consistent when the schools
were viewed individually.

The most open principal

behavior was found at a non-merit pay school, the least
open principal behavior was found at a merit pay
school.

However, a merit pay school did have the

second highest openness score for principal behavior.
3.

The stronger directive scores were found in

the merit pay schools when grouped by school types.
4.

As individual schools, a merit pay school

had the most directive score, a non-merit pay school
the lowest.

However, a non-merit pay school had the

second strongest score and a merit pay school had the
second lowest directive principal behavior.
S.

Significant differences existed between the

two merit pay schools beyond the .OS level of
acceptance on the directive subtest.
6.

Also on the directive subtest, a significant

difference was present between the School C score and
the scores produced by both merit pay schools.
7.

A significant difference was also noted

between Schools B and D.

School B having a higher

directive score.
8.

The stronger supportive properties were

observed in the non-merit pay schools when schools were
grouped by type, significant beyond the .OS level.
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9.

As individual schools the findings for

supportive behavior were consistent.

Both non-merit

pay schools maintained stronger scores for the
supportive dimension.

Significance beyond the .05

acceptance level was found between the two merit pay
schools, between Schools A and C, B and C, and between
Schools B and D.
10.

Teachers with 20 plus years experience

perceived more supportive principal behavior than their
colleagues with 0-5 years experience.

The difference

in scores between the two groups was significant.
However, teachers with 11-15 years experience had a
stronger supportive property differing significantly
with their colleagues with 16-20 years experience.
11.

There were no significant differences found

between union and non-union teachers on the supportive
subtest.
12.

The scores for restrictive behavior for

principals by school types were strongest at the merit
pay schools when schools were grouped.
13.

The results of the previous finding are not

consistent when individual school scores are observed.
Both the strongest and weakest scores for restrictive
behavior were found at the non-merit pay schools.
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14.

There were no significant differences

between the scores by school types on the restrictive ·
subtest.
lS.

A level of significance beyond the .OS

level of acceptance for significance existed between
the two merit pay schools.
16.

Schools A and D differed significantly from

one another.
17.

The merit pay school scores differed

significantly on the restrictive behavior subtest.
18.

A significant difference was found to exist

between Schools B and C on the restrictive subtest:
School C, a non-merit pay school, having the less
restrictive score.
19.

There was a significant difference in the

restrictive scores beyond the .OS level between union
and non-union members.

Union members produced the

stronger score for the property.
Conclusions
This study provides information that may have
implications for those school boards and those
administrators who may consider merit pay a viable
salary system for implementation in a school district.
Some of the conclusions that may be drawn from this
study based upon data gathering and analysis are:
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1.

A review of the literature suggests that

there are differing opinions as to the impact of merit
pay plans on teacher interaction, that such systems
create a more competitive school environment and they
may create dissatisfaction.

Because of the potential

for impact on a school's organizational climate, school
district decision makers may view this study as
providing inferences that may be helpful in guiding
decisions about merit pay.
2.

The openness indices for both faculty

relations and principal behavior did not differ greatly
between the merit pay and non-merit pay schools when
the schools were grouped by type.

Therefore, it can be

concluded that merit pay programs have little
relationship to the degree of openness in a school.
While many other variables may impact organizational
climate, apparently a merit pay program is not one of
them.
3.

Based upon the scoring and assessment

procedures for the Organizational Climate Description
Questionnaire-RE there does not appear to be a great
deal of difference in the strength of collegial
relationships among faculty in merit pay and non-merit
pay schools, although there are some differences
between individual schools in this study.

Again, it

may be concluded that merit pay programs do not effect
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the collegial relationships that occur within the
organizational climate of a school.
4.

There are similar levels of engagement

both the merit pay and non-merit pay schools.

at

Teachers

at the non-merit pay schools had slightly stronger
engaged climate.

Although non-merit pay teachers had a

slightly stronger engaged climate than their merit pay
counterparts, no significant differences were noted
between the two groups.

It can be concluded therefore,

that performance based pay systems have no effect upon
the level of engagement between school faculty members.
5.

The merit pay schools had a consistently

stronger intimate behavior property than did the
non-merit pay schools.

This was shown in the mean

scores for school types as well as for individual
schools.

It may therefore be concluded that merit pay

programs may play a role in establishing the level of
intimacy in a school's organizational climate.
6.

By school types, merit pay teachers viewed

their principals to be more directive than did
non-merit pay teachers.

It may be concluded,

therefore, that teachers in merit pay schools preceive
their principals to be more directive than teachers in
non-merit pay schools.
7.

Based upon scores for the supportive subtest

for OCDQ-RE supportive principal behavior is stronger
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in the non-merit pay schools than in the non-merit pay
schools.

The data for school types on the supportive·

subtests was consistent with the data produced by
individual

schools~

the non-merit pay schools both

maintained stronger supportive principal dimensions.
It can therefore be concluded that merit pay systems
may act as a variable in establishing the perceived
level of principal support that teachers in merit pay
schools may hold.
8.

It may be inferred that because merit pay

teachers perceive their principals to be more
restrictive and less supportive than non-merit pay
teachers, a higher level of intimacy within the
organizational climate may develop due to the perceived
higher restrictiveness and lower supportiveness from
principals.
9.

For the restrictive dimension, union

teachers produced a significantly higher score than
their non-union counterparts.

Therefore, it can be

concluded that teachers who are affiliated with unions
view their principals to be more restrictive.
Consequently, union membership may be a variable that
effects restrictiveness.
10.

Teachers with 11-15 years experience are

more engaged than faculty with 0-5 years experience.
It may therefore be concluded that faculty members in
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the middle range of experience are more school
oriented.
11.

Teachers with 20 plus years experience

possess a stronger collegial property than teachers
with 0-5 years experience.

Therefore, the conclusion

may be drawn that schools with more experienced faculty
will have higher levels of staff collegiality.
12.

Faculty members with 20 plus years

experience perceive stronger principal support than
teachers with 0-5 years experience.

It can therefore

be concluded from the data accumulated in this study
that teaching experience is a variable that plays a
role in the organizational climate of school.

Those

teachers with 20 plus years of experience had
consistently higher scores in the collegial, as well
as, principal supportive dimensions.
13.

Teachers having taught 11-15 years produced

a stronger supportive score than did teachers with
16-20 years experience.
14.

Those teachers with more than 20 years

experience indicated more supportive behavior

by

principals than those with 16-20 years experience.
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Recommendations
A review of the literature and the results of
this study indicate that merit pay may continue to be a
controversial subject.

As efforts are made to increase

the accountability of schools and improve the quality
of instruction in hopes of raising student achievement,
it is inevitable that improved salary structures for
teachers become part of the dialogue.

For those who

make decisions about teacher salaries, merit pay may be
seen as an attractive alternative to reward good
teachers and rid the system of poorer faculty,
especially at a time when the level of funding schools,
particularly in Illinois, is low.

Based upon this

investigation the following recommendations are made:
1.

A study similar to this investigation should

be conducted on a wider basis.

The focus of this study

was narrowed to four schools in a suburban setting.
The population was almost entirely female.

A broader

study, that would include teachers from rural as well
as from larger metropolitan school districts would be
beneficial in helping to assess the organizational
climate of schools throughout the state or nation as a
whole.
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2.

Prior to implementation of merit pay

programs it is recommended that school district
decision makers review the literature dealing with
merit pay and organizational climate, and carefully
consider the benefits as well as the costs of such
programs.
3.

Before making a decision to implement a

merit pay program, school district decision makers may
wish to consider assessment of the organizational
climate of schools within the district.
4.

Further studies such as this investigation

should be completed to determine the consistency of
results and data with regard to the subtests of the
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RE as
well as in a high school setting using the
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire-RS
(Revised Secondary).
5.

Because teacher evaluation, evaluative

techniques and skills of evaluators determine the size
of merit pay grants, a study should be conducted that
deals with assessment of organizational climate,
teacher evaluation procedures, and the skills
principals possess as evaluators.

Such information may

prove beneficial in Illinois wherein school
administrators must be recertified and trained in
evaluation practices and techniques through the

127
state-mandated Administrator's Academy.

This

information may be helpful to administrators in
assisting them in developing evaluative techniques and
procedures that have a positive effect on
organizational climate.

Also, because teaching

experience appears to be a variable that plays a role
in organizational climate, administrators should have
information about various evaluative procedures that
may work best in various types of schools based upon
the make-up of the school's faculty.
6.

A study similar to this research, should be

conducted comparing the organizational climate of both
merit pay and non-merit pay schools with student
achievement, the end product of the process of
schooling.
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6839 Park Lane
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463
August 30, 1987

Professor Wayne K. Hoy
Graduate School of Education
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903
Dear Professor Hoy:
As Part of my research project for my doctoral
dissertation at Loyola University of Chicago, I would
like to administer the Organizational Climate
Description Questionnaire-RE to groups of elementary
school teachers in Illinois. The focus of my research
will deal with school climate in merit pay and
non-merit pay Illinois elementary schools. Please
forward to me information relative to securing copies
of the OCDQ-RE as well as scoring information and all
other pertinent data regarding the Questionnaire.
Your prompt response to this request is greatly
appreciated.
Sincerely,

Bernard J. Jumbeck

THE STATE UNIVERSllY OF NEW JERSEY

RUTGERS
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Graduate School of Education· 10 Seminary Place· New Brunswick· New Jersey 08903

September 4, 1987

Mr. Bernard J. Jumbeck

6839 Park Lane
Palos Heights, ILLINOIS 60463
Dear Mr. Jumbeck:
You have my permission to use the 0~-RE in your research. I have
enclosed an article on the OC~-RE, a copy of the 0~-RE and a copy of
the scoring instrument.
The only request I make of you is that you reference the article in any
manuscript or publication which you write, and send me a copy of the
results of the research.
_,,.-·"")

/

~7,·

Wayne K. Hoy
Professor

WKH:csh
Encl:

135
To Score the OCDQ-RE
1. Group the items according to the six subtests (See
enclosure).
2. RO=l S0=2 00=3 V0=4 Each item (except negative
items*) should be scored according to the numerical
code. The items with an * are scored in reverse-R0=4 S0=3 00=2 VO=l. For the subjects in each
school, the scores for each item are to be averaged
across individuals (an average item school score is
created): hence, each school will have a mean score
for each of the items of the OCDQ-RE. Then the
mean scores for each of the subtests should be
summed to produce the school score on each of the
subtests. NOTE: This procedure is used because
the appropriate unit of analysis is the school, not
the individual.
3. The higher the score on each dimension, the
stronger that property for the school.
4. TWO openess indices can be created for each
school as follows:
a.)
Standardize the school scores for each
subtest.
I suggest you make the mean 50 and the
standard deviation 10.

b.) Openess Index for faculty relations= [C+I-D]
WHERE C = the standardized collegial subtest score,
I= the standardized intimate score, and D is the
standardized disengaged score.
c.) Openness Index for principal
behavior=[S-D-R] WHERE S= the standardized
supportive subtest score, D is the standardized
directive score, and S is the standardized
restrictive score.
5. Norms have not been established;, hence,
comparisons should be made within your sample.
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The Six Dimensions of the OCDQ-RE
and Items that Compose the Six Subtests
Teacher Behavior:

Collegial

Collegial behavior is indicated by supportive,
professional relationships among staff.

Teachers are

proud of their school, enjoy working with their
colleagues, and feel a sense of accomplishment and
fulfillment in their jobs.

They exhibit energy,

enthusiasm, and positiveness.
Collegial Items

*

1.

The teachers accomplish their work with vim,
vigor and pleasure.

6.

Teachers leave school immediately after school
is over.

12.

Most of the teachers here accept the faults of
their colleagues.

19.

Teachers help and support each other.

26.

Teachers are proud of their school.

32.

New teachers are readily accepted by their
colleagues.

* 37.
40.

*

Teachers socialize together in small, select
groups.
Teachers respect the professional competence of
their colleagues.

scored negatively
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Teacher Behavior:

Intimate

Intimate behavior reflects a pervasive social support
network among staff.

Teachers have gotten to know one

another well enough to be personal friends, and they
socialize regularly both in and out of the working
environment.
Intimate Items
2.

Teachers' closest friends are other faculty
members at this school.

7.

Teachers invite other faculty members to visit
them at home.

13.

Teachers know the family background of other
faculty members.

20.

Teachers have fun socializing together during
school time.

27.

Teachers have parties for each other.

33.

Teachers socialize with each other on a regular
basis.

38.

Teachers provide strong social support for
colleagues.

Teacher Behavior:

Disengaged

Disengaged behavior is exhibited by teachers who have
no personal stake in the school, their colleagues, or
their profession.

They are simply putting in their

time and are non-productive in group efforts or
team-building: they have no common goal orientation.
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Their behavior is negative and critical toward
colleagues and the organization.
Disengaged Items
3.

Faculty meetings are useless.

18.

There is a minority group of teachers who always
oppose the majority.

14.

Teachers exert group pressure on non-conforming
faculty members.

21.

Teachers ramble when they talk at faculty
meetings.

Principal Behavior:

Supportive

Supportive behavior by the principal is reflected in
his/her genuine rapport with staff.

Supportive

principals respect the professional competence of their
staff and also try to exhibit a personal interest in
each teacher.

They enjoy working with teachers to set

goals and solve problems, and they are willing to
accept teachers suggestions and feedback.

Praise is

given genuinely and frequently, and criticism is
handled constructively.
Supportive Items
4.

The principal goes out of his/her way to help
teachers.

9.

The principal uses constructive criticism.

15.

The principal explains his/her reasons for
criticism to teachers.
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16.

The principal listens to and accepts teachers'
suggestions.

22.

The principal looks out for the personal
welfare of teachers.

23.

The principal treats teachers as equals.

28.

The principal compliments teachers.

29.

The principal is easy to understand.

42.

The principal goes out of his/her way to show
appreciation to teachers.

Principal Behavior:

Directive

Directive behavior is indicated by principals who are
rigid and keep a distance between employer and
employee.

Such principals need to maintain constant

control over all teacher and school activities, down to
the smallest details.

Directive principals are

monitors and autocrats, who give no consideration to
interpersonal relationships.

Directive Items
5.

The principal rules with an iron fist.

10.

The principal checks the sign-in sheet every
morning.

17.

The principal schedules the work for the
teachers.

24.

The principal corrects teachers' mistakes.

30.

The principal closely checks classroom (teacher)
activities.

34.

The principal supervises teachers closely.
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35.

The principal checks lesson plans.

39.

The principal is autocratic.

41.

ThE~

principal monitors everything teachers do.

Principal Behavior:

Restrictive

Restrictive behavior is exhibited by principals who
discourage interaction and productivity because of
their overwhelming concern for strict adherence to
policies, procedures and administrative detail.
Restrictive principals leave no room for teacher input
or creative approaches to school concerns, and they
burden others with non-educative activities.

Restrictive Items
11.

Routine duties interfere with the job of
teaching.

18.

Teachers have too many committeee requirements.

25.

Administrative paperwork is burdensome at this
school.

* 31.
36.

Clerical support reduces teachers' paperwork.
Teachers are burdened with busywork.

*scored negatively
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6839 Park Lane
Palos Heights, Illinois 60463
May 3, 1988

Dear Teacher:
I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago
working on my doctoral dissertation. The study deals
with different aspects of organizational climate and
various administrative practices in different types of
schools.
Your assistance is requested in assessing the
organizational climate of your school. The
Organizational Climate Description Questionnaire - R E,
developed by Professor Wayne K. Hoy, has been selected
as the assessment tool. Please respond to the
Questionnaire and return it to your school principal
using the enclosed envelope by Friday, May 13.
In addition to the O C D Q - R E, please complete the
short demographic data sheet which is also included in
this packet. The information gleaned from that data
will assist me in developing a school profile for the
0 C D Q - R E responses. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and will be utilized for academic
and research purposes only.
Thank you for your kind assistance and attention to my
request.
Sincerely,

Bernard J. Jumbeck
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0 C D Q -

R E

DIRECTIONS: The following statements are about your
school. Please indicate the extent to which each
statement characterizes your school by circling the
appropriate response.
RO= RARELY OCCURS: SO= SOMETIMES OCCURS:
OCCURS: VF= VERY FREQUENTLY OCCURS
1.

O= OFTEN

The teachers accomplish their work
with vim, vigor and pleasure. -----

RO

SO

0

VF

Teachers' closest friends are other
faculty members at this school. ---

RO

SO

0

VF

3.

Faculty meetings are useless

-----

RO

SO

0

VF

4.

The principal goes out of his/her
way to help teachers. -------------

RO

SO

O

VF

The principal rules with an iron
fist.
---------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

Teachers leave school immediately
after school is over. -------------

RO

SO

O

VF

Teachers invite other faculty
members to visit them at home.

RO

SO

O

VF

There is a minority group of
teachers who always oppose
the majority. ---------------------

RO

SO

o

VF

The principal uses constructive
criticism. ------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

10. The principal checks the sign-in
sheet every morning. ---------------

RO

SO

o

VF

11. Routine duties interfere with the
job of teaching. ------------------

RO

SO

O

VF

12. Most of the teachers here accept
the faults of their colleagues.

RO

so

o

VF

13. Teachers know the family background of other faculty members.

RO

SO

O

VF

2.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
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14. Teachers exert group pressure on
non-conforming faculty members.

RO

SO

O

VF

15. The principal explains his/her
reasons for criticism to teachers.--

RO

SO

O

VF

16. The principal listens to and
accepts teachers' suggestions. -----

RO

SO

0

VF

17. The principal schedules the
work for the teachers. ------------

RO

SO

0

VF

18. Teachers have too many committee
requirements. ---------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

19. Teachers help and support each
other. ----------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

20. Teachers have fun socializing
together during school time. -------

RO

SO

O

VF

21. Teachers ramble when they talk
at faculty meetings. --------------

RO

SO

0

VF

22. The principal looks out for the
personal welfare of teachers. ------

RO

SO

O

VF

23. The principal treats teachers as
equals. ---------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

24. The principal corrects teachers'
mistakes. -------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

25. Administrative paperwork is
burdensome at this school. --------

RO

SO

o

VF

26. Teachers are proud of their school.
------------------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

27. Teachers have parties for each other.
----------------------------------- RO

SO

0

VF

28. The principal compliments teachers.
-----------------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

29. The principal is easy to understand.
------------------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

30. The principal closely checks
classroom (teacher) activities.

RO

SO

0

VF
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31. Clerical support reduces teachers'
paperwork. ------------------------

RO

so

o

VF

32. New teachers are readily accepted
colleagues. -----------------------

RO

SO

o

VF

33. Teachers socialize with each other
on a regular basis. ----------------

RO

SO

O

VF

34. The principal supervises teachers
closely.
-------------------------

RO

SO

O

VF

35. The principal checks lesson plans.
------------------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

36. Teachers are burdened with busywork.
------------------------------------

RO

SO

0

VF

37. Teachers socialize together in
small, select groups. -------------

RO

SO

0

VF

38. Teachers provide strong social
support for colleagues. ------------

RO

SO

o

VF

39. The principal is autocratic.

RO

SO

O

VF

40. Teachers respect the professional
competence of their colleagues.

RO

SO

O

VF

41. The principal monitors everything
teachers do. ----------------------

RO

SO

O

VF

42. The principal goes out of his/her
way to show appreciation to
teachers. -------------------------

RO

SO

o

VF

------
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PLEASE SUPPY THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

A.

How many years have you been a teacher?
years

B.

How long have you worked in your current school
system?
years

c.

How long have you worked in your current position?
years

D.

Are you affliliated with a local teacher
association?
yes
no___

E.

With what national teacher association is your
local association affiliated?
N.E.A.
A.F.T.
None- - Other (please specify)
-------------~

F.

Are you tenured?

Yes - - -

G.

What is your major area of teaching specialization?
Elementary education
Science
Mathematics
~Art
Physical education~
Special Education
Music
English
Social Studies
Other (please specifyr-

No

__________________

H.

What grade level(s) do you teach?
----------~

I.

What is your marital status?
Married
Single
Widowed
Separated- - -~-

Divorced

J.

What is your sex?
Male
Female

L.

Degree Status (Bachelor's, Master's, Doctorate)
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